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Keeping the Coast Clear: Lessons About
Protecting the Natural Environment by
Controlling Industrial Development
Under Delaware's Coastal Zone Act
KENNETH T. KRISTL*
In 1970, as the nation celebrated the first Earth Day, the
State of Delaware stood at a proverbial fork in the road concerning
its then largely undeveloped coastal area. Shell Oil was poised to
begin construction of Delaware's second large oil refinery, this one
to be located next to the Bombay Hook National Wildlife Refuge.1
Zapata Norness, a bulk shipping company, was planning to build
a 300 acre island in the Delaware Bay for staging shipments of
bulk quantities of coal and iron ore. 2 The United States Depart-
ment of Commerce was working with oil and shipping companies
to make the Delaware Bay "the premier supertanker port and in-
dustrial center in the East. ' 3 Thus, Delaware had a choice: to in-
dustrialize its coastal areas (much like its neighbors New Jersey
and Pennsylvania had done farther up the Delaware River), or to
restrict such industrialization and preserve the natural resources
of the coast.
After a temporary moratorium on all new industrial develop-
ment imposed via executive order by then-Governor Russell Peter-
son in January 1970, 4 a Governor's Task Force recommended the
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1. See RUSSELL W. PETERSON, REBEL WITH A CONSCIENCE 125-26 (1999).
2. Id. at 127.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 128.
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path of restricted industrial development. 5 In June 1971, clearly
driven by concern over the looming industrialization of its coast,6
the State of Delaware chose coastal resource preservation over un-
bridled industrialization when it enacted the Delaware Coastal
Zone Act 7 ("CZA" or "Act") over significant opposition from busi-
ness and various political interests." The opening sentences of the
5. See GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON MARINE & COASTAL AFFAIRS, COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT FOR DELAWARE (Feb. 18, 1971), http://unicorn.csc.noaa.gov/docs/czic/
HT393.D3_C634_1971/89EDDC.pdf [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT). Later state
reports described the Task Force's conclusions as follows:
In February 1971, the Task Force completed a preliminary report recom-
mending that industries compatible with high environmental standards
be encouraged, but that no further incompatible industries be allowed in
the coastal zone. Incompatibility would be determined on the basis of
quantities and types of pollutants and the magnitude of adverse environ-
mental effects resulting from the scale and nature of the industry. The
Task Force also recommended prohibiting a deepwater port facility in
Delaware Bay. The report emphasized the recreational values of the
coastal zone for Delawareans and for visitors from other states.
See STATE COASTAL ZONE INDUS. CONTROL BD. & DEL. STATE PLANNING OFFICE, DELA-
WARE COASTAL ZONE PLANNING AND REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION: REPORT FOR THE
PERIOD JUNE 28, 1971-JUNE 30, 1973 1 (Nov. 1973), http://unicor.csc.noaa.gov/docs/
czic/KFD265.A52_D3_1973/3139.pdf [hereinafter 1973 REPORT]; STATE COASTAL
ZONE INDUS. CONTROL BD. & OFFICE OF MGMT., BUDGET & PLANNING, COASTAL ZONE
ACT ADMINISTRATION: JUNE 28, 197 1-JuNE 30, 1977 1 [hereinafter 1977 REPORT] (copy
on file with author); STATE COASTAL ZONE INDUS. CONTROL BD. & DEL. DEP'T OF NATU-
RAL RESOURCES AND ENVTL. CONTROL, REPORT ON COASTAL ZONE ACT ADMINISTRA-
TION: JULY 1977-DECEMBER 1983 1-1 (Sept. 1984), http://unicorn.csc.noaa.gov/docs/
czic/HT393.D3_D469_1984189EE60.pdf [hereinafter 1984 REPORT]. While the Task
Force's recommendation to ban new heavy industry shows up in the Act, most of the
other recommendations set forth in the Report do not. See supra TASK FORCE REPORT
at 3-4.
6. See 1973 REPORT, supra note 5, at 1:
Enactment of the Coastal Zone Act was the result of the deep concern of
many people and public officials in Delaware over the likelihood of indus-
trial growth in the coastal zone resulting in a large new petroleum refin-
ery and a deepwater terminal for supertankers and related heavy
industries in areas not yet industrialized. Land ownership and some local
zoning policies indicated that such industrialization was a real possibil-
ity. The lack of a State policy towards industrial growth in the coastal
zone and regulatory authority over it left the State in a position of not
having an effective voice in the use of this uniquely valuable and environ-
mentally sensitive State resource - the coastal zone.
Nearly identical language can be found in the 1977 REPORT, supra note 5, at 1, and
the 1984 REPORT, supra note 5, at 1-1.
7. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7001 (2007).
8. See PETERSON, supra note 1, at 123 -149. Opposition came from the Delaware
Chamber of Commerce, which at that time had all of the major companies in Dela-
ware on its Executive Committee. Id. at 131. As noted above, the United States Sec-
retary of Commerce in the Nixon Administration had been working on a plan to make
the Delaware Bay "the premier supertanker and industrial center in the East," id. at
127, and thus the Nixon Administration ultimately opposed the Act, id. at 144 - 146.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/2
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Act's first section capture the essence of the Act's intent and goal
in stark terms:
It is hereby determined that the coastal areas of Delaware are
the most critical areas for the future of the State in terms of the
quality of life in the State. It is, therefore, the declared public
policy of the State to control the location, extent and type of in-
dustrial development in Delaware's coastal areas. In so doing,
the State can better protect the natural environment of its bay
and coastal areas and safeguard their use primarily for recrea-
tion and tourism. 9
On one level, statements by coastal states recognizing the im-
portance of their coastal resources and the state's desire to protect
them are not uncommon.10 In fact, such statements are en-
couraged by the federal Coastal Zone Management Act." For
Governor Peterson's autobiographical account of the formulation and passage of the
Act provides a fascinating insider look at the political and legislative strategies uti-
lized to overcome this opposition and obtain passage of the Act.
9. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7001 (2007). The original version of the Act can be
found at 58 Del. Laws 490 (1971).
10. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 9-7-11 (2006) ("The purpose of this chapter is to pro-
mote, improve ind safeguard the lands and waters located in the coastal areas of this
state through a comprehensive and cooperative program designed to preserve, en-
hance and develop such valuable resources for the present and future well-being and
general welfare of the citizens of this state"); CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 30001.5 (2006)
(setting forth legislative findings that "the California coastal zone is a distinct and
valuable natural resource of vital and enduring interest to all the people and exists as
a delicately balanced ecosystem" and "that the permanent protection of the state's
natural and scenic resources is a paramount concern to present and future residents
of the state and nation"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22A-91 (2006) (legislative findings that
the coastal area "represents an asset of great present and potential value to the eco-
nomic well-being of the state, and there is a state interest in the effective manage-
ment, beneficial use, protection and development of the coastal area" and "is rich in a
variety of natural, economic, recreational, cultural and aesthetic resources, but the
full realization of their value can be achieved only by encouraging further develop-
ment in suitable areas and by protecting those areas unsuited to development"); GA.
CODE ANN. § 12-5-321 (2006) (legislative findings that "the coastal area of Georgia
comprises a vital natural resource system," "provides a natural recreation resource
which has become vitally linked to the economy of Georgia's coast and to that of the
entire state," and "that activities and structures in the coastal area must be regulated
to ensure that the values and functions of coastal waters and natural habitats are not
impaired and to fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as public trustees of the
coastal waters and habitats for succeeding generations"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-20
(2006) (legislative finding that 'The coastal zone is rich in a variety of natural, com-
mercial, recreational and industrial resources of immediate and potential value to the
present and future well-being of the State" and citing "the urgent need to protect and
to give high priority to natural systems in the coastal zone").
11. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (2006) (listing congressional findings in connection
with the federal Coastal Zone Management Act ("FCZMA")). In promulgating the
3
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most states, the value of protecting coastal resources must be bal-
anced against interests in industrial development. 12 By contrast,
FCZMA in 1972, Congress specifically found that "[tihe key to more effective protec-
tion and use of the land and water resources of the coastal zone is to encourage the
states to exercise their full authority over the lands and waters in the coastal zone."
16 U.S.C. § 1451(i) (2006). The Act has been described as encouraging "responsible
economic, cultural, and recreational growth in coastal zones, consistent with the ...
notion that coastal management should foster 'the widest possible variety of benefi-
cial uses so as to maximize net social return.'" John R. Nolon, Disaster Mitigation
through Land Use Strategies," 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 959, 972-74 (Sept. 2007) (quot-
ing STRATTON COMM'N, REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON MARINE Sci., ENG'G & RES., OUR
NATION AND THE SEA: A PLAN FOR NATIONAL ACTION 57 (1969)), http://www.lib.noaa.
gov/noaainfo/heritage/stratton/title.html (select "Contents" link and then the "Func-
tions and Powers of State Coastal Zone Authorities" link). While the full extent of the
FCZMA is beyond the scope of this article, Delaware's Coastal Zone Management Pro-
gram (which includes the CZA) has been approved under the FCZMA since 1979. See
Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 632 F. Supp. 1225, 1250 (D. Del. 1986), affd, 822
F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1987) (discussing approvals under FCZMA).
12. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 9-7-11 (2006) (identifying competing needs for coastal
resources, including the needs of industry, and citing "the urgent need to balance de-
velopment for the preservation of the natural systems in the coastal area"); ALASKA
STAT. § 46.40.020 (2006) (identifying various objectives of coastal management pro-
gram that include protection of resources and development of industrial or commer-
cial enterprises and "the orderly, balanced utilization and protection of the resources
of the coastal area"); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30001.5 (2006) (identifying as basic goal
of state to "assure orderly, balanced utilization and conservation of coastal zone re-
sources taking into account the social and economic needs of the people of the state");
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-92 (2006) (identifying as general goal "to insure that the de-
velopment, preservation or use of the land and water resources of the coastal area
proceeds in a manner consistent with the capability of the land and water resources to
support development, preservation or use without significantly disrupting either the
natural environment or sound economic growth"); HAw. REV. STAT. § 205A-4 (2006)
("In implementing the objectives of the coastal zone management program, the agen-
cies shall give full consideration to ecological, cultural, historic, esthetic, recreational,
scenic, and open space values, and coastal hazards, as well as to needs for economic
development"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.2 (2006) ("it is the policy of this state to
achieve a proper balance between development and conservation and encourage the
use of coastal resources"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.22(3) (2006) (identifying pub-
lic policy of state to be "[tlo support and encourage multiple use of coastal resources
consistent with the maintenance and enhancement of renewable resource manage-
ment and productivity, the need to provide for adequate economic growth and devel-
opment and the minimization of adverse effects of one resource use upon another, and
without imposing any undue restriction on any user"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 483-
B:2 (2006) (list of interests that state's minimum standard shall serve include protec-
tion and conserving resources and providing for economic development in proximity to
water); S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-20 (2006) (legislative finding that statute needed "in
light of competing demands and the urgent need to protect and to give high priority to
natural systems in the coastal zone while balancing economic interests"); WASH. REV.
CODE § 90.58.020 (2006) (stating that:
It is the policy of the state to provide for the management of the shore-
lines of the state by planning for and fostering all reasonable and appro-
priate uses. This policy is designed to insure the development of these
shorelines in a manner which, while allowing for limited reduction of
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/2
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Delaware's Coastal Zone Act eschews balancing altogether when
it comes to new "heavy industry uses"13 and "bulk product trans-
fer facilities" 14 in the coastal zone. 15 They are flatly prohibited
because of the environmental threats they pose:
rights of the public in the navigable waters, will promote and enhance the
public interest. This policy contemplates protecting against adverse ef-
fects to the public health, the land and its vegetation and wildlife, and the
waters of the state and their aquatic life, while protecting generally pub-
lic rights of navigation and corollary rights incidental thereto.).
13. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7003 (2007.)
14. Id.
15. The Act defines the coastal zone as follows:
[Aill that area of the State, whether land, water or subaqueous land be-
tween the territorial limits of Delaware in the Delaware River, Delaware
Bay and Atlantic Ocean, and a line formed by certain Delaware highways
and roads as follows:
Beginning at the Delaware-Pennsylvania line at a place where said line
intersects U.S. Route 13; thence southward along the said U.S. Route 13
until it intersects the right-of-way of U.S. Route 1-495; thence along said
1-495 right-of-way until the said 1-495 right-of-way intersects Delaware
Route 9 south of Wilmington; thence along said Delaware Route 9 to the
point of its intersection with Delaware Route 273; thence along said Dela-
ware Route 273 to U.S. 13; thence along U.S. 13 to Maintenance Road
409; thence along Maintenance Road 409 to Delaware Road 71; thence
along Delaware Road 71 to its intersection with Delaware Road 54;
thence along Delaware Road 54 to Delaware Road 896; thence along Dela-
ware Road 896 to Maintenance Road 396; thence along Maintenance
Road 396 to Maintenance Road 398; thence along Maintenance Road 398
to the Maryland state line; thence southward along the Maryland state
line to Maintenance Road 433; thence along Maintenance Road 433 to
Maintenance Road 63; thence along Maintenance Road 63 to Mainte-
nance Road 412; thence along Maintenance Road 412 to U.S. 13; thence
along U.S. 13 to Delaware 299 at Odessa; thence along Delaware Route
299 to its intersection with Delaware Route 9; thence along Delaware
Route 9 to U.S. 113; thence along U.S. Route 113 to Maintenance Road
8A; thence along Maintenance Road 8A to Maintenance Road 7 to the
point of its intersection with Delaware Route 14; thence along Delaware
Route 14 to Delaware Route 24; thence along Delaware Route 24 to Main-
tenance Road 331; thence along Maintenance Road 331 to Maintenance
Road 334; thence along Maintenance Road 334 to Delaware Route 26;
thence along Delaware Route 26 to Maintenance Road 365; thence along
Maintenance Road 365 to Maintenance Road 84; thence along Mainte-
nance Road 84 to Maintenance Road 384; thence along Maintenance Road
384 to Maintenance Road 382A; thence along Maintenance Road 382A to
Maintenance Road 389; thence along Maintenance Road 389 to Mainte-
nance Road 58; thence along Maintenance Road 58 to Maintenance Road
395; thence along Maintenance Road 395 to the Maryland state line.
DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7002(a) (2007). A simpler way to describe it is all territorial
water of the State of Delaware and all land from the Delaware coastline in for approx-
imately two miles. See DEL. STATE PLANNING OFFICE, DELAWARE AND OUTER CONTI-
NENTAL SHELF DEVELOPMENT: ROLES AND SYSTEMS AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF
5
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this chapter seeks to prohibit entirely the construction of new
heavy industry in its coastal areas, which industry is deter-
mined to be incompatible with the protection of that natural en-
vironment in those areas. . . . It is further determined that
offshore bulk product transfer facilities represent a significant
danger of pollution to the coastal zone and generate pressure for
the construction of industrial plants in the coastal zone, which
construction is declared to be against public policy. For these
reasons, prohibition against bulk product transfer facilities in
the coastal zone is deemed imperative. 16
The radical and unprecedented nature and extent of these abso-
lute prohibitions have led to the Act being called "the first compre-
hensive coastal land use law in the world aimed at curbing
industrial uses of a coastal area"17 and "one of the most original
and innovative environmental and land use statutes in the
world."18 In addition, the controls and requirements imposed on
permitted development or expansion for "non-conforming uses"'19
and "manufacturing uses"2 0-especially the regulatory require-
ment for the "offset" of the use's negative environmental im-
pacts 21-are unique. The Act's combination of the prohibitions
and controls provide an interesting blueprint for any coastal state
to use in protecting its own natural coastal resources.
The Coastal Zone Act has been in force for nearly 37 years,
withstanding attempts to remove the prohibition on heavy indus-
try in 1974,22 1977,23 and 1985,24 as well as a challenge to its con-
stitutionality in 1985.25 The Act itself has been expressly
amended only eight times, 26 and three of those amendments re-
GOVERNMENT 33 (June 1976) [hereinafter CONTINENTAL SHELF REPORT] (on file with
Widener School of Law Legal Information Center, call number KFD 443 .D4 1976).
16. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7001 (2007).
17. James May & Wendy Myers, It Is Still Not A Shore Thing: Environmental
Improvement And Industrial Uses Of Delaware's Coastal Zone, DEL. LAWYER, Spring
1999, at 20.
18. See 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. pmbl. (Weil 2007).
19. See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, §§ 7002(b), 7004(a) (2007).
20. See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, §§ 7004(a) (2007).
21. See 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. § 9.0 (Weil 2007).
22. See PETERSON, supra note 1, at 180-87.
23. Id. at 187-91.
24. Id. at 194-96.
25. See Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1987). This arti-
cle discusses the constitutional challenge presented in this case, infra Section II(F).
26. In chronological order, those amendments are: 61 Del. Laws 164 (1977); 62
Del. Laws 277 (1979); 63 Del. Laws 425 (1981); 64 Del. Laws 571 at § 6 (1984); 66 Del.
[Vol. 25
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lated solely to administration of the Act.27 In addition, after a
false start in 1994,28 Delaware's Department of Natural Resources
and Environmental Control ("DNREC"), pursuant to its statutory
authority, 29 finally issued regulations under the Act in 1999 (the
"1999 Regulations"). 30 Yet despite the longevity, importance, and
far-reaching impact of the Act, there has been no scholarly analy-
sis of how the Act has been interpreted and applied beyond a de-
tailed overview of the 1999 Regulations. 31 This article is the first
attempt to provide as complete a comprehensive scholarly analy-
sis as possible. 32
Laws 491 (1988); 68 Del. Laws 290 (1991); 68 Del. Laws 1187 (1992); 71 Del. Laws
894 (1998).
27. See 61 Del. Laws 164 (1977) (changing references to official in charge of ad-
ministering the Act from State Planner to Director of the Office of Management,
Budget and Planning); 63 Del. Laws 425 (1981) (changing administration of Act to
Secretary of Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control); 68 Del.
Laws 290 (1991) (requiring Secretary to set a schedule of fees under Act).
28. The Coastal Zone Industrial Control Board adopted an initial set of procedu-
ral regulations in December 1971 that were described by the Chancery Court as "con-
sist[ing] of five pages of which only one five-line provision addressed substantive
matters." Chem. Indus. Council of Del. v. State Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., 1994
WL 274295, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1994). A version of the Board's early regulations
(albeit seven pages in length) can be found in 1973 REPORT, supra note 5, at 88-94. In
1990, the state started a process of drafting a more substantive and comprehensive
set of regulations, ultimately resulting in the Board's issuance of final regulations in
1993. Chem. Indus. Council of Del., 1994 WL 274295 at *2-5. A group of plaintiffs
challenged the 1993 Regulations under Delaware's Freedom of Information Act, 29
Del. C. § 10001 et seq., for procedural irregularities in the public notices and the
Board's use of executive sessions during its deliberations. Chem. Indus. Council of
Del., 1994 WL 274295, at *5. The Court agreed with both arguments and therefore
voided the regulations. Id. at *14. The Court later denied the Board's motion for re-
argument. Chem. Indus. Council of Del. v. State Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd.,
1994 WL 274308 (Del. Ch. June 10, 1994).
29. See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7005(b) (2007) (DNREC has the authority to "is-
sue regulations including, but not limited to, regulations governing disposition of per-
mit requests, and setting forth procedures for hearings before himself or herself and
the Board. Provided, that all such regulations shall be subject to approval by the
Board."). The Delaware Attorney General has opined that the Coastal Zone Indus-
trial Control Board may not independently adopt or amend regulations regarding the
substance of the Act. See Attorney General Opinion No. 94-4018, 1994 WL 284951 at
*1 (May 4, 1994) ("[T]he Act is designed such that the Board is an appeals board, to
which recourse from DNREC's permitting and other decisions may be had. Other
than this authority to monitor DNREC decisions, whether regulatory or case related,
there is no independent power vested in the Board by the Act.").
30. See 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. (Weil 2004).
31. See May & Myers, supra note 17 (providing an overview of the Regulations in
anticipation of their 1999 publication).
32. Working with the State of Delaware's Public Archives, the Coastal Zone In-
dustrial Control Board, the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environ-
mental Control, and the Delaware State Bar Association's Environmental Law
Committee, the author has compiled all Board and Court decisions and all Attorney
7
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This article consists of three parts. In the first, the article
discusses the general principles of statutory interpretation that
have been articulated under the Act. These principles provide im-
portant guideposts that can help interpretations stay true to the
meaning of and purpose behind the Act. The second part dis-
cusses the provisions of the Act, complete with a comprehensive
annotation to the interpretations of those terms made by the Dela-
ware's Attorney General, Delaware's Coastal Zone Industrial Con-
trol Board (the agency charged with reviewing initial decisions
under the Act 33), and Delaware courts. The third part discusses
the lessons to learn from the interpretation and application of the
Act for both Delaware and other coastal states grappling with the
inevitable competition between industrial development and pres-
ervation of natural coastal resources. For Delaware, these lessons
focus on emerging issues and challenges under the Act, including
the need to emphasize and consciously apply the general princi-
ples of statutory construction in order to keep evolving interpreta-
tions moored to the Act, and the now controversial meanings of
"use" and "nonconforming use" under the Act. In the broader na-
tional context, other coastal states can learn how to protect re-
maining coastal resources while respecting existing industrial
development and find tools for linking future acceptable develop-
ment to environmental improvement.
I. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION FOR THE ACT
Before delving into the details of the Act, it is important to
identify the general principles that have governed attempts to in-
terpret the Act during its first 36 years. Such general principles of
statutory construction can have an important effect on any inter-
pretation by providing familiar guideposts that serve to focus the
analysis in a clear, consistent way. Identification of these general
principles of statutory construction is therefore an important first
step to understanding the Act.
General opinions interpreting the Act, as well as status decisions rendered by the
State Planner or the Secretary of DNREC during the periods June 28, 1971-April
2008 (with the exception of twenty-five status decisions identified by DNREC in re-
sponse to a FOIA request that were not present in the files at the Public Archive). The
analysis here is comprehensive as to the information available to the author.
33. See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, §§ 7005, 7008 (2007). Throughout this article, the
Coastal Zone Industrial Control Board is referred to as "the Board."
[Vol. 25
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The Delaware Supreme Court has articulated four general
principles for interpreting the Act. These principles are: recogniz-
ing that the purpose of the Act is important to understanding the
Act; interpreting so as to harmonize all sections of the Act; liber-
ally construing the Act to maximize its applicability; and favoring
interpretations with reasonable consequences over those that pro-
duce unreasonable consequences or absurd results.
Purpose of the Act Is Important
The first principle is that the purpose of the Act-articulated
in § 7001-must play a preeminent role in any interpretation. As
the Court stated in Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Industrial
Control Board,34 when applying the statute "the fundamental rule
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature."35
While on one level this is nothing more than standard statutory
construction, it is important because it emphasizes the critical
role that § 7001 must play in any statutory interpretation. Sec-
tion 7001 makes clear what the legislature intended-no heavy
industry uses or bulk product transfer facilities and only permit-
ted manufacturing uses-because of the threat posed to the natu-
ral environment of the Delaware Bay and coastal areas.36 It
articulates a policy choice that protection of the environment wins
over prohibited types of industrial development because that "bet-
ter protect[s] the natural environment of its bay and coastal areas
and safeguard [s] their use primarily for recreation and tourism," 37
a use that is viewed as "critical ... for the future of the State in
terms of the quality of life in the State."38 It declares "construc-
tion of industrial plants in the coastal zone" to be "against public
policy."39 These are strong words for the purpose behind the Act.
Thus, when interpreting the Act, recognition of the importance of
the Act's purpose requires favoring environmental protection over
certain types of development because that was the clear prefer-
ence of the legislature itself.
34. Coastal Barge Corporation v. Coastal Zone Indus. Bd., 492 A.2d 1242 (Del.
1985).
35. Id. at 1246.
36. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. § 7001.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
2008]
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Harmonize the Entire Act
The second general principle requires interpretations to har-
monize the entire Act. As the court stated in Coastal Barge, "[a]
statute is passed by the General Assembly as a whole and not in
parts or sections. Consequently, each part or section should be
read in light of every other part or section to produce a harmoni-
ous whole."40 Thus, interpretations of the Act which merely focus
on a single word or phrase while ignoring the rest of the Act (in-
cluding the clear purpose articulated in § 7001) are improper. In
Coastal Barge Corp., the Delaware Supreme Court found that the
vessel-to-vessel transfer of coal in the Delaware River fell within
the Act's prohibition against bulk product transfer facilities even
though the literal language of § 7002(f) prohibited only the trans-
fer of bulk products "from vessel to onshore facility or vice
versa."41 The Coastal Barge court found that the literal language
of § 7002(f) was ambiguous because to interpret it as excluding
vessel-to-vessel transfers would lead to unreasonable or absurd
consequences (the fourth principle discussed infra) in light of the
expressed statutory purpose in § 7001 of the Act.42 For purposes
of the principle of harmonization, the Coastal Barge court looked
at the language of § 7001, with emphasis on the language that
"prohibition against bulk product transfer facilities in the coastal
zone is deemed imperative," 43 and noted the incongruity of apply-
ing the literal terms of § 7002(f):
In contrast to this strongly worded statutory purpose, §7002(f)
would literally prohibit only port facilities "for the transfer of
bulk quantities of any substance from vessel to onshore facility
or vice versa". But if a significant pollution potential existed,
what difference would it make if the transfer was from vessel to
vessel (barge from super collier) or from vessel to land to vessel
40. Coastal Barge Corp., 492 A.2d at 1245.
41. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7002(f). The Secretary had ruled that the coal light-
ering operation was not prohibited under the Act, but the Board reversed, and the
Superior Court upheld the Board's decision. Coastal Barge Corp., A.2d at 1244. In-
terestingly, Coastal Barge was not the first coal lightering operation reviewed under
the Act. In 1981, National Bulk Carriers, Inc. proposed such an operation, and the
Secretary, on the basis of an Attorney General opinion finding that the lack of a trans-
fer from ship to shore excluded the project from regulation under the Act, ruled as he
did in Coastal Barge. See 1984 REPORT, supra note 5, at 3-13. For a summary of the
June 24, 1981 Attorney General opinion involved in the National Bulk Carriers mat-
ter, see id. at 4-3.
42. Coastal Barge Corp., 492 A.2d at 1246.
43. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7001.
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(barge to land to collier). The danger of pollution and industrial-
ization to the Delaware Coast is the same. To distinguish be-
tween transfers made vessel to vessel and those made vessel to
land would lead to such irrational and absurd results that it
compels our determination that the Coastal Zone Act is
ambiguous.4 4
In other words, because the General Assembly found that offshore
bulk product transfer facilities pose a "significant danger" of pollu-
tion to the coastal zone, excluding vessel-to-vessel transfers
makes no sense. For the Delaware Supreme Court, harmonizing
§ 7002(f) with § 7001 required that § 7002(f) must be interpreted
in a way that prevents the pollution the General Assembly wanted
to prevent, and so vessel-to-vessel transfers must be prohibited as
well.45 Thus, courts or the Board must harmonize the entire Act,
and are not free to disregard one section of the CZA when inter-
preting a term in a different section.
Liberally Construe the Act to Maximize Applicability
The third general principle is a rule of liberal construction. In
City of Wilmington v. Parcel of Land,46 the Delaware Supreme
Court stated:
The Coastal Zone Act is an environmental protection measure
designed to regulate closely the types of uses permitted and car-
ried on in the area adjacent to the Delaware River, the Dela-
ware Bay and the Atlantic Ocean. The legislative purpose of the
Act is set forth in [Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 7001] .... Given this
broad statement of purpose and sweeping use of legislative au-
thority, we conclude that the Act should be liberally construed
in order to fully achieve the legislative goal of environmental
protection. 47
City of Wilmington arose out of the City's condemnation of certain
real property near the Port of Wilmington. 48 The issue in the case
was the value of the highest and best use of the property, with the
city arguing for a lower value based on the land's use as an im-
port-export facility.49 The owner argued for a higher value based
44. Coastal Barge Corp., 492 A.2d at 1246.
45. Id. at 1247.
46. City of Wilmington v. Parcel of Land Known, 607 A.2d 1163 (Del. 1992).
47. Id. at 1166.
48. Id. at 1164.
49. Id. at 1164-65.
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in part on the presence of fluorspar tailings on the site, which
would provide $700,000 of additional value if further processed,
plus $209,000 for salvage value of the fluorspar processing equip-
ment (even though there was no fluorspar processing present at
the site).50 The owner's appraiser assumed that the Coastal Zone
Act would not be an impediment to conducting the hypothetical
fluorspar processing on the site in order to realize the value.51
The Superior Court ultimately agreed with the property owner ap-
praiser's assumption, and the issue on appeal was whether the
court erred in instructing the commissioners that, for valuation
purposes, a fluorspar operation on the property would not be sub-
ject to the Coastal Zone Act. 52
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, articulating its lib-
eral construction rule. The property owner argued that the hypo-
thetical fluorspar processing operation was not "manufacturing"
as defined in § 7002(d) 53 (and therefore was not subject to permit-
ting under the Act) because it involved "the mere separation of
fluorspar from other elements of the soil" that starts with fluor-
spar and ends with fluorspar.5 4 The City of Wilmington Court re-
jected this argument as "a pinched construction of the scope of the
term 'manufacturing' [that] would clearly defeat the legislative
purpose of the Act 'to control the location, extent and type of devel-
opment in Delaware's coastal areas'."55 Instead, the Court applied
its liberal construction rule:
If the term "manufacturing" is afforded a liberal meaning the
proposed fluorspar proceeding plainly is subject to regulation.
The processing operation would entail the use of chemical re-
agents, earth moving equipment, and mechanical equipment to
separate the saleable grade fluorspar from the impurities with
which it is mixed in an ore-like state. Furthermore, once the
separation is complete, the resultant slurry must be disposed of
50. Id. at 1165. In other words, the property owner wanted the property value to
include this hypothetical fluorspar processing operation, even though no such
processing was taking place at the time of the condemnation.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1165-66.
53. Section 7002(d) defines manufacturing as "the mechanical or chemical trans-
formation of organic or inorganic substances into new products, characteristically us-
ing power-driven machines and materials handling equipment, and including
establishments engaged in assembling component parts of manufactured products,
provided the new product is not a structure or other fixed improvement." DEL. CODE
ANN. TIT. 7, § 7002(d) (2007).
54. City of Wilmington, 607 A.2d at 1166.
55. Id. at 1166-67 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7001).
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safely. As a Seibert official conceded at trial, "[nlobody wants to
see this stuff [i.e. the slurry] to come [sic] into the river." Far
from being outside the scope of the Act, we believe such an oper-
ation is precisely the type of industrial use the General Assem-
bly intended to regulate. It is a mechanical and chemical
transformation of an inorganic substance (fluorspar tailings)
into a new product (saleable grade fluorspar) through the use of
"power-driven machines and materials handling equipment."
We, therefore, hold that the fluorspar processing operation envi-
sioned here, if put into practice, would be a "manufacturing" ac-
tivity as defined in the Coastal Zone Act and thus subject to the
Act's permit procedures. 56
The Court therefore found that the commissioners in the condem-
nation proceeding should be allowed to consider the impact of ob-
taining a Coastal Zone Act permit would have on the value of the
property.5 7
The "liberality" espoused in City of Wilmington relates to an
inclusiveness in the application and scope of the Act. On ques-
tions of whether the Act applies to a situation or not, a rule of
liberal construction requires that that one err on the side of apply-
ing the restrictions and prohibitions of the Act (instead of finding
that something is not covered by the Act) because that best meets
the legislative purpose set forth in § 7001.58 It is a bias towards
inclusion within the scope of the Act so that the Act's provisions
and prohibitions are fully implemented. The corollary of this rule
is that exceptions in the Act must be defined narrowly in order to
assure that the Act and its prohibitions have the maximum oppor-
tunity to protect the environment as they are designed to do.
Courts and the Board must therefore liberally construe the Act to
maximize applicability.
Favor Reasonable Interpretations Over Unreasonable
Ones
The fourth general principle is a rule favoring interpretations
with reasonable consequences over those with unreasonable con-
sequences. As noted before, in Coastal Barge, the Delaware Su-
preme Court found that the vessel-to-vessel transfer of coal in the
Delaware River fell within the Coastal Zone Act's prohibition
56. Id. at 1167.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1166 (construe liberally "in order to fully achieve the legislative goal of
environmental protection").
20081
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against bulk product transfer facilities even though the literal lan-
guage of § 7002(f) required the transfer of bulk products "from
vessel to onshore facility or vice versa." The Coastal Barge Court
applied what it called "the golden rule of statutory interpretatio'n:"
The golden rule of statutory interpretation to which we refer is
that unreasonableness of the result produced by one among al-
ternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for re-
jecting that interpretation in favor of another which would
produce a reasonable result. 59
The Court analyzed the purpose of the Act set forth in § 7001,
with particular emphasis on the "prohibition against bulk product
transfer facilities in the coastal zone is deemed imperative"60 lan-
guage of that section. The Court held that, because the pollution
potential from vessel to vessel transfers was the same as transfers
from vessel to land, 61 giving the "from vessel to onshore facility or
vice versa" its literal meaning "would lead to the irrational and
absurd result of prohibiting only those facilities for the transfer of
substances from vessel to an onshore facility or vice versa, regard-
less of the potential threat of pollution and industrialization to the
Delaware Coast."62 The Court therefore construed § 7002(f)'s
"from vessel to onshore facility or vice versa" language to be
merely "illustrative" of a bulk product transfer facility,63 and held
that vessel to vessel transfers are also included within § 7002(f)'s
definition. 64
Thus, Coastal Barge adds to the Act's statutory interpretation
the clear rule that interpretations of the Act which allow a frus-
tration or diminishment of the purpose of the Act are irrational
and absurd and must be rejected. In effect, a court or the Board
must, when interpreting the Act, favor reasonable interpretations
over unreasonable ones.
Why are these principles important? As Coastal Barge and
City of Wilmington demonstrate, interpretations of the Act can
and do arise in contexts that the Act's language does not directly
address. The four principles provide powerful insight and gui-
59. Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., 492 A.2d 1247, 1247
(Del. 1985).
60. DEL. CODE. ANN. TIT. 7, § 7001.
61. Coastal Barge, 492 A.2d at 1246.
62. Id. at 1247.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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dance for the interpretation process that imbue the view of the
Act's language with appreciation for and deference to the over-
arching purpose of the Act. The four principles thus serve an im-
portant purpose: they provide guideposts that can ground
interpretation of the language of the Act in the Act's purpose and
ultimate intent.
II. THE STRUCTURE AND INTERPRETRATION OF
THE COASTAL ZONE ACT PROVISIONS
The first three sentences of the CZA make clear that it is fo-
cused on the environmental effect of industrial development in the
coastal zone. They declare the "public policy" of the state to be the
control of "the location, extent and type of industrial development
in Delaware's coastal areas" so that "the State can better protect
the natural environment of its bay and coastal areas and safe-
guard their use primarily for recreation and tourism."65 In its ef-
fort to carry out this declared public policy, the CZA recognizes
four different categories of industrial development:
(1) heavy industry uses;66
(2) bulk product transfer facilities;67
(3) permitted industrial or manufacturing uses;68 and
(4) nonconforming uses. 69
Non-industrial uses are outside the scope of the Act's regulation,70
65. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, §7001 (2004).
66. See id. §§ 7002(e), 7003.
67. See id. §§ 7001, 7002(f), 7003.
68. See id. § 7004(a).
69. See §§ 7002(b), 7004(a)
70. This is evident from the fact that the Act speaks only in terms of industrial
development, with emphasis on heavy industry uses, bulk product transfer facilities,
permitted industrial or manufacturing uses, and nonconforming uses. In addition,
the 1999 Regulations issued under the Act contain language indicating that some
non-industrial development is not within the regulatory purview of the Act. See 7-
100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. §§ 5.1 to .19 (Weil 2007), which set forth types of facilities or
activities that "shall be deemed not to constitute initiation, expansion or extension of
heavy industry or manufacturing uses under these regulations." The facilities/activi-
ties on the list are:
§ 5.1: farming;
§ 5.2: warehouses or other st6rage facilities, but not including tank farms;
§ 5.3: Tank farms of less than 5 acres;
§ 5.4: Parking lots or structures, health care and day care facilities, maintenance
facilities, commercial establishments not involved in manufacturing, office buildings,
recreational facilities, and facilities related to the management of wildlife;
§ 5.5: Facilities used in transmitting, distributing, transforming, switching, and
otherwise transporting and converting electrical energy;
§ 5.6: Facilities used to generate electric power directly from solar energy;
2008]
15
52 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25
as are public sewage treatment and recycling facilities. 71 The
CZA's basic approach is to prohibit heavy industry uses and bulk
product transfer facilities, regulate and control permitted indus-
trial or manufacturing uses, and tolerate nonconforming uses.
During the nearly 37 years of the Act's existence, there have
been 9 decisions by Delaware and federal courts, 18 interpretive
decisions by the Board, at least 25 opinions by the Delaware At-
torney General, and at least 266 status decisions by the State
Planner or the Secretary of DNREC 72 that provide some interpre-
tive insight into the Act. Using the language of the Act and the
1999 Regulations, as well as these interpretations in actual cases
§ 5.7: Repair and maintenance of existing electrical generating facilities provided
such repair or maintenance does not result in any negative environmental impacts;
§ 5.8: Back-up emergency and stand-by sources of power generation to adequately
accommodate emergency industry needs when outside supply fails;
§ 5.9: Continued repair, maintenance and use of any non-conforming bulk prod-
uct transfer facility where the facility transfers the same products and materials that
it did on June 28, 1971;
§ 5.10: Bulk product transfer operations at dock facilities owned or acquired in
the future by the Diamond State Port Corp. within the Port of Wilmington
§ 5.11: Docking facilities used as bulk product transfer facilities located on pri-
vately owned lands within the Port of Wilmington which had been granted a status
decision extending the bulk product transfer exemption prior to the effective date of
the regulations;
§ 5.12: Docking facilities not used as bulk product transfer facilities;
§ 5.13: Pipelines originating outside, traversing through, and terminating outside
the Coastal Zone without connecting to a heavy industry or manufacturing use;
§ 5.14: Maintenance and repair of existing structures;
§ 5.15: Replacement in-kind of existing equipment or installation of in-line spares
for existing equipment;
§ 5.16: Installation and modification of pollution control equipment for non-con-
forming uses within their designated footprint;
§ 5.17: Any facility that received an exemption for the activity in question;
§ 5.18: Research and development activities within existing research and devel-
opment facilities; and
§ 5.19: Any other activity which the Secretary determines, through the status
decision process, is not an expansion or extension of a non-conforming use or a heavy
industry use.
71. See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7003 (2007) ("Provided, that this section shall not
apply to public sewage treatment or recycling plants"). The Board has ruled that the
recycling portion of this exception applies only to "an entity which is government-
sponsored or owned by the people."' In re Texaco's Proposed Re-Refining, No. 260SD,
at 16 (Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. July 9, 1992) (appeal of the Secretary's deci-
sion finding Texaco's re-refining to be a "New Prohibited Heavy Industry") (copy on
file with author) (rejecting claim that oil re-refining operation at Texaco refinery
could fall under recycling plant exception).
72. These numbers are as of April 1, 2008, and include the addition of the Novem-
ber 16, 2007 Superior Court decision in DNREC v. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc., No.
06A-12-001-ESB (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2007) (copy on file with author).
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and matters, one can examine in detail the Act's prohibitions and
provisions.
A. The Prohibition of Heavy Industry Uses
The CZA provides that "[h]eavy industry uses of any kind not
in operation on June 28, 1971, are prohibited in the coastal zone
and no permits may be issued therefor."73 As § 7001 makes clear,
such uses are prohibited because such "industry is determined to
be incompatible with the protection of that natural environment
in those areas."74 Thus, heavy industry and the coastal zone's
natural environment are in fundamental conflict, and because the
CZA seeks to "better protect the natural environment of its bay
and coastal areas and safeguard their use primarily for recreation
and tourism," 75 the environment wins.
Given that the CZA absolutely prohibits heavy industry uses,
what constitutes such a use (and is therefore prohibited under the
CZA) is of critical significance. The Act defines the term as
follows:
"Heavy industry use" means a use characteristically involving
more than 20 acres, and characteristically employing some but
not necessarily all of such equipment such as, but not limited to,
smokestacks, tanks, distillation or reaction columns, chemical
processing equipment, scrubbing towers, pickling equipment
and waste-treatment lagoons; which industry, although conceiv-
ably operable without polluting the environment, has the poten-
tial to pollute when equipment malfunctions or human error
occurs. Examples of heavy industry are oil refineries, basic steel
manufacturing plants, basic cellulosic pulp-paper mills, and
chemical plants such as petrochemical complexes. An incinera-
tor structure or facility which, including the incinerator, con-
tains 5,000 square feet or more, whether public or private, is
"heavy industry" for purpose of this chapter. Generic examples
of uses not included in the definition of "heavy industry" are
such uses as garment factories, automobile assembly plants and
jewelry and leather goods manufacturing establishments, and
73. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7003. As the Board stated in In re Appeal of Occiden-
tal Chem. Co., No. 259, at 10 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. July 29, 1992), "In
precise and clear language, the Act identifies construction of new heavy industry as
incompatible with protection of the environment in the Coastal Zone. DEL. CODE ANN.
TIT. 7, § 7001. Thus, the Legislature intended that heavy industry should be regarded
as a category of development to be entirely prohibited in the coastal zone."
74. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7001.
75. Id.
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on-shore facilities, less than 20 acres in size, consisting of ware-
houses, equipment repair and maintenance structures, open
storage areas, office and communications buildings, helipads,
parking space and other service or supply structures required
for the transfer of materials and workers in support of off-shore
research, exploration and development operations; provided,
however, that on-shore facilities shall not include tank farms or
storage tanks.76
Other than the specific examples of facilities that are or are not
heavy industry uses, this definition merely provides basic criteria
based on size, equipment, and potential to pollute, but little gui-
dance on how to apply the criteria. For example:
Size. The definition suggests that heavy industry uses are
"characteristically" greater than 20 acres in size, which of
course suggests that uses less that 20 acres in size might still
satisfy the definition. Indeed, in one of its early decisions, the
Board rejected an applicant's argument that no use can be a
heavy industry use under the Act unless it was greater than
twenty acres in size,7 7 reasoning that "[tihe Legislature did not
intend that the Act would permit the proliferation of fifteen acre
oil refineries, basic steel manufacturing plants, basic cellulose
pulp paper mill[s], or chemical plants."7 8
Equipment. The definition provides a list of the types of
equipment that are indicative of a heavy industry use, but in a
76. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7002(e). In the 1971 original version of the Act, this
definition did not include the reference to an incinerator of 5,000 square feet or more
being heavy industry, see 58 Del. Laws 490, 492 (1971); this language was added in
1998. See 71 Del. Laws 894 (1998). Likewise, the original definition did not include in
the generic examples of non-heavy industry the language starting at "and on-shore
facilities, less than 20 acres in size" to the end of the definition, see 58 Del. Laws 490,
492 (1971); this language was added in 1979. See 62 Del. Laws 277 (1979). Some of
the facilities listed in the 1979 amendment were described as "onshore support facili-
ties for Outer Continental shelf oil and gas activities." 1984 REPORT, supra note 5, at
1-1.
77. In re DeGussa Delaware, Inc., No. 270SD, at 4 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Con-
trol Bd. Nov. 12, 1973) (copy on file with author). See also In re Texaco's Proposed Re-
Refining, No. 260SD, at 17 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. July 9, 1992) (appeal
of the Secretary's decision finding Texaco's re-refining to be a "New Prohibited Heavy
Industry") (copy on file with author) ("the mere fact that the proposed project occupies
fewer than 20 acres of land cannot salvage it from classification as a heavy industry").
78. In re DeGussa Delaware, Inc., No. 270SD, at 4 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Con-
trol Bd. Nov. 12, 1973). This does not mean that a size of less than twenty acres is
irrelevant; indeed, the aerosol plant proposed by DeGussa Delaware was only six
acres in size, and the fact that the facility's size was "far less areas that the twenty
acre standard of the Act" was one of the factors which convinced the Board that the
facility in question was not a heavy industry use. Id. at 7.
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way that leaves the parameters unclear. For example, the list
itself is not exhaustive but merely equipment that is "character-
istically" used, suggesting that other equipment not listed might
also indicate a heavy industry use. The definition suggests that
use of only "some" of the listed equipment can be enough to give
rise to a heavy industry use. In short, the list merely gives gui-
dance 79 and is not a checklist that specifies a certain quantity of
equipment types necessary to satisfy the definition. For the in-
dividual items on the list, the definition fails to provide numeri-
cal guidelines about how many of a particular piece of
equipment in necessary for a facility to be considered a heavy
industry use. Indeed, the Board has stated that "the character
and quantity of equipment to be utilized in the proposed facility
is not determinative as to the 'use' classification of the facil-
ity,"80 although it can be a factor in determining whether the
facility is a heavy industry use.81
Pollution/Potential to Pollute. The definition suggests that
a facility's actual ability to pollute and its potential to pollute-
whether from operation or from accident-is indicative of a
heavy industry use. Evidence of no pollution may be enough to
suggest that it is not a heavy industry use,8 2 while that fact that
nearly all of the chemicals produced in or utilized by a process
are hazardous tilts towards a heavy industry use.8 3 However,
the amount of actual or potential pollution necessary to trigger
a finding of heavy industry use is undefined, raising at least the
possibility that even small amounts could be enough to make a
facility satisfy the definition.
The CZA itself suggests that the General Assembly recog-
nized this imprecision of the definition. In the provisions estab-
lishing the administration of the Act, the initial version of the Act
79. See In re Texaco's Proposed Re-Refining, No. 260SD, at 16 ("The equipment
listed and the processes identified are intended only to exemplify the types of opera-
tions meant to be prohibited in total").
80. In re DeGussa Delaware, No. 270SD, at 6.
81. See id. at 7-8 (factor supporting finding that aerosol plant was not heavy in-
dustry use was that "the facility will employ a only a limited quantity of the equip-
ment listed by the act as characteristic of a 'heavy industry use'); In re Appeal of
Occidental Chem. Co., No. 259, at 11 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. July 29,
1992) (on file with author) (closed vessel reactor, scrubbers, wastewater treatment,
tanks, and neutralizing equipment in proposed bleach chlorine manufacturing pro-
cess are "forms and types of equipment suggestive of heavy industry").
82. See In re DeGussa Delaware, Inc., No. 270SD, at 8 (factor supporting finding
that aerosol plant was not heavy industry use was that "the facility is identical to
facilities which the appellant operates without detrimental effect upon the
environment").
83. See In re Appeal of Occidental Chem. Co., No. 259, at 11.
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required the State Planner to "develop and propose... regulations
for the further elaboration of the definition of 'heavy industry' in a
manner consistent with the purposes and provisions of this chap-
ter,"8 4 a responsibility that now resides in the Secretary of Dela-
ware's Department of Natural Resources and Environmental
Control.8 5 The State Planner attempted to meet this require-
ment,8 6 but no regulatory definition was ever produced. After the
shift of administrative responsibility in 1981, the Secretary has so
far not issued regulations that define "heavy industry uses" except
indirectly (by listing facilities and activities that do not constitute
heavy industry uses or permitted industry uses).8 7
B. The Prohibition of Bulk Product Transfer Facilities
Like it does with heavy industry uses, the CZA makes clear
that "offshore gas, liquid or solid bulk product transfer facilities
which are not in operation on June 28, 1971, are prohibited in the
coastal zone, and no permit may be issued therefor."88 The reason
for this prohibition is found in the first section of the Act:
[O]ffshore bulk product transfer facilities represent a significant
danger of pollution to the coastal zone and generate pressure for
the construction of industrial plants in the coastal zone, which
construction is declared to be against public policy. For these
reasons, prohibition against bulk product transfer facilities in
the coastal zone is deemed imperative.8 9
84. 58 Del. Laws at 495 (1971).
85. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7005(c) (2007).
86. See 1977 REPORT, supra note 5, at 7. The State Planner proposed an "elabora-
tion" of heavy industry, and hired Batelle, Columbus Laboratories to develop a rating
system that would serve "two needs, i.e. allowing for determination of the least desir-
able industries which should be banned, and providing a method for reviewing an
application to determine its potential impact and assess its acceptability." 1973 RE-
PORT, supra note 5, at 4-5. The Board rejected the State Planner's proposed definition
because it tried to identify heavy industry uses by categories instead of doing so on an
individual basis. 1977 REPORT at 7-8. There is no evidence that any other definition
from these efforts was ever adopted and used in the CZA process.
87. See 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. § 4.1 (Weil 2007) (merely stating that "heavy
industry use of any kind not in operation on June 28, 1971" are prohibited in the
Coastal Zone, without any definition for the term); §§ 5-1 - 5-19 setting forth list of
types of facilities or activities that "shall be deemed not to constitute initiation, ex-
pansion or extension of heavy industry or manufacturing uses under these regula-
tions." The list is set forth supra, note 65.
88. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7003 (2007).
89. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7001 (2007).
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This antagonism against bulk product transfer facilities-even go-
ing so far as to declare them and their effects to be "against public
policy"-carries through to the Regulations under the Act, which
prohibit not only bulk product transfer facilities themselves, 90 but
any attempt to create the equivalent of a bulk product transfer
facility. 91
What, then, is a bulk product transfer facility subject to the
Act's prohibition? The Act itself defines it this way:
"Bulk product transfer facility" means any port or dock facility,
whether an artificial island or attached to shore by any means,
for the transfer of bulk quantities of any substance from vessel
to onshore facility or vice versa. Not included in this definition
is a docking facility or pier for a single industrial or manufactur-
ing facility for which a permit is granted or which is a noncon-
forming use. Likewise, docking facilities for the Port of
Wilmington are not included in this definition. 92
The Coastal Barge decision, as explained above, expanded this
language to include transfers between vessels even though there
may not be a transfer to or from the shore. 93 "Bulk product" has
been interpreted to mean "cargoes shipped in large mingled
masses and not to cargoes of individually packaged units or indi-
vidual product items."94 The 1999 Regulations did not expand on
this definition, except to formally define what "bulk product" and
"docking facility" mean.95 A very early opinion by the Delaware
90. See 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. § 4.3 (Wel 2007) (identifying "offshore gas,
liquid, or solid bulk product transfer facilities which were not in operation on June 28,
1971" as "uses or activities prohibited in the Coastal Zone").
91. See 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. § 4.5 (Weil 2007) ("bulk product transfer facil-
ities and pipelines which serve as bulk transfer facilities that were not in operation on
June 28, 1971" prohibited); id. § 4.6 ("the conversion or use of existing unregulated,
exempt, or permitted docking facilities for the transfer of bulk products" prohibited);
id. § 4.7 ("the construction, establishment, or operation of offshore gas, liquid, or solid
bulk product transfer facilities which were not in operation on June 28, 1971" prohib-
ited); and id. § 4.8 ("individual pipelines of sets of pipelines which are not associated
with a use that obtains a permit but which meet the definition of bulk product trans-
fer facilities" prohibited). The fact that some of these seem to overlap with each other
and with § 4.3 suggests an attempt to create broad coverage for the prohibition.
92. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7002(f).
93. See Coastal Barge, 492 A.2d at 1246.
94. Del. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 78-018 (Oct. 5, 1978).
95. The 1999 Regulations define "bulk product" as "loose masses of cargo such as
oil, grain, gas and minerals, which are typically stored in the hold of a vessel. Cargoes
such as automobiles, machinery, bags of salt and palletized items that are individu-
ally packaged or contained are not considered bulk products in the application of this
definition" and "docking facility" as:
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Attorney General interpreted the prohibition in § 7003 to mean
that "the Legislature absolutely prohibited gas, liquid and solid
bulk product transfer facilities in the Coastal Zone if all or any
portion of the such facilities are found beyond the mean low water
mark."96 A later opinion held that a pipeline could qualify as a
bulk product transfer facility.97
This definition does create a notable exception: a docking fa-
cility or pier that is used for a single industrial or manufacturing
facility is not a bulk product transfer facility.98 The industrial or
manufacturing facility must be one "for which a permit is granted"
or which is a "nonconforming use."99 The Board's very first appeal
decision involved a prohibited bulk product transfer facility that
ultimately fit under this exception. 100
any structures and/or equipment used to temporarily secure a vessel to a
shoreline or another vessel so that materials, cargo, and/or people may be
transferred between the vessel and the shore, or between two vessels to-
gether with associated land, equipment, and structures so as to allow the
receiving, accumulating, safekeeping, storage, and preparation of cargoes
for further shipment, and administrative maintenance purposes directly
related to such receiving, accumulating, safekeeping, storage, and prepa-
ration of cargoes for further shipment.
7-100-101 DEL CODE DEL. REGS. § 3.0 (Weil 2007).
96. Del. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-110 (Sept. 21, 1971). Finding that § 7003 prohibits
"off shore" bulk product transfer facilities, the Attorney General looked to definitions
of "shore" under Delaware law, which is "the land between the high and low water
marks," quoting State v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 228 A.2d 587, 600 (Del. Ch.
1967). He concluded that "off shore would be, therefore, not on the shore, and ex-
tending beyond the shore or extending beyond the mean low water mark." 1971 Del.
AG LEXIS 109 at *6. An Attorney General Opinion of the same date found that the
mean low water mark to use is the mark as it existed on the day the Act was passed.
See 1973 REPORT, supra note 5, at 113-114.
97. See 1984 REPORT, supra note 5, at 4-1 (summarizing July 6 and September 2,
1977 opinions).
98. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. § 7002(f) (2007). The definition also excludes docking fa-
cilities for the Port of Wilmington. Id. This includes facilities within the Port of Wil-
mington on private land. See In re Application of the Del. Terminal Co., No. CZ 2003-
04 (Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. Feb. 10, 2004) (status decision) (copy on file with
author) (reversing status decision that barred expansion of petroleum storage facility
within the Port of Wilmington on privately owned land).
99. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7002(f). The exception can only apply to one facility;
other facilities cannot take advantage of the exception. See 1984 REPORT, supra note
5, at 4-4 (summarizing August 6, 1981 Attorney General Opinion). The effect of the
exception is that, for permitted facilities, the exception retains CZA control over the
project by virtue of the permitting of the industrial or manufacturing use that the
docking facility or pier serves. For nonconforming uses, the exception combines the
pier with the underlying nonconforming use to complete the Act's limited control over
nonconforming uses.
100. 1973 REPORT, supra note 5, at 9. In November 29, 1972, the Board affirmed a
status decision that an extension of a pier at Sun Oil's Marcus Hook, PA Refinery was
a prohibited bulk product transfer facility. Id. The Board's primary reason for its
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The Board, in Coastal Zone Status Decision on the Application
of Crown Landing LLC, specifically examined the issue of the sin-
gle manufacturing use exception. 10 1 Crown Landing planned to
build a dock in the Delaware River connected to an on-shore facil-
ity in New Jersey for the purpose of unloading bulk quantities of
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from supertankers. 10 2 Because
decision was that the pier "would largely be a conduit (for trans-shipment) of petro-
leum products rather than a facility necessary to operation" of the refinery, and that
this increased trans-shipment capacity was therefore an "entirely new use." Id. at 26.
The Report goes on to note that, after the ruling, Sun Oil agreed to modify its use of
the pier, and after the changes, Sun Oil, the Board, and the State Planner agreed the
pier fit under the single industrial facility exception. Id. at 9.
101. In re Application of Crown Landing, LLC, No. CZ 2005-01, at 4 (Del. Coastal
Zone Indus. Control Bd. Apr. 14, 2005) (status decision) (copy on file with author).
102. Crown Landing did not challenge the assumption that a dock located in the
Delaware River (and therefore located in the State of Delaware by virtue of Dela-
ware's ownership of the River up to the low water mark on the New Jersey side of the
river, see New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934)), but servicing a facility lo-
cated in New Jersey, could fall within the jurisdiction of the Act. A 1978 Attorney
General Opinion concluded that it does by noting:
If the development on the eastern rim of the state were to be uncontrolled
by the regulatory mechanism of the Coastal Zone Act, pressure of devel-
opment antithetical to the Act would exist .... The question then be-
comes the extent to which these same rules apply where the adjacent
facility is located in another jurisdiction over which the Delaware legisla-
ture has no authority. There is no reason to believe that the legislature
intended any different rule to apply to unattached lands from the lands
attached to the Delaware shore within the Coastal Zone. Allowing the
bulk product transfer facilities to generate pressure for industry any-
where in the water and air basins would be contrary to the purposes of
the Act. This would apply no less to that part of Delaware which is located
adjacent to New Jersey than to the fast lands of Delaware itself. Failure
to apply the exemption to those facilities built adjacent to New Jersey
would lead to an anomalous administration of the Act. The Act should not
be read so as to produce an absurd result.
Del. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 78-018, 1978 WL 22485, at * 2. Though Crown Landing did
not appeal under the Act, the battle has moved to a different venue-the United
States Supreme Court. See Kenneth T. Kristl, A Boundary Dispute's Effect on Siting
an LNG Terminal, 21 NATURAL RES. & ENv'T 34 (2006). On April 12, 2007, Special
Master Ralph Lancaster, Jr. issued his report and recommendation, finding that Del-
aware's police power applied to projects on the New Jersey shore that extended into
the Delaware River and into the State of Delaware. See Report of the Special Master
at 84-85, New Jersey v. Delaware, No. 134 (U.S. Apr. 12, 2007), http://www.
pierceatwood.com/files/301_PLD%20Report%20of'o20Special%20Master%20PDF%20
(W0725778).pdf. New Jersey filed exceptions to the Report, the case was argued to
the United States Supreme Court on November 27, 2007, and on March 31, 2008 the
Supreme Court ruled 6-2 in Delaware's favor. See New Jersey v. Delaware, No. 134,
slip op. at 1, 552 U.S. - (Mar. 31, 2008). Justice Ginsberg, writing for the Court,
accepted the Special Master's recommendation "in principal part," id. at 3, and found
that "New Jersey and Delaware have overlapping authority to regulate riparian
structures and operations of extraordinary character extending outshore of New
Jersey's domain into territory over which Delaware is sovereign." Id. Given Dela-
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LNG is kept at a temperature of about -260' F, the on-shore facil-
ity would heat up the LNG, add nitrogen (as necessary to adjust
BTU content) and mercaptin (an odorant that gives natural gas its
smell), and then pump the natural gas into existing pipelines to
feed natural gas demand in the Northeast. 10 3 Crown Landing ar-
gued that the dock at which supertankers would unload fit under
the single manufacturing facility exception in the § 7002(f) defini-
tion because the on-shore processes were a form of manufacturing
in that the product entering the natural gas pipelines would be
different from the LNG coming off the tanker. 0 4 The Board found
as a matter of fact, however, that the on-shore component was not
a manufacturing facility because the facility was "a single, inte-
grated facility the onshore component of which exists solely to
support the offshore component."105 Thus, as a matter of law, "the
entire proposed facility [was] a docking facility which [did] not
support a manufacturing or other facility."10 6 In other words, the
Board viewed the single manufacturing facility exception as re-
ware's finding that the LNG terminal was a heavy industry use and bulk product
transfer facility under the CZA, the majority concluded that "[clonsistent with the
scope of its retained police power to regulate certain riparian uses, it was within Dela-
ware's authority to prohibit construction of the facility within its domain." Id. at 23.
103. Crown Landing, CZ 2005-01, at 4.
104. Id. at 5. To prove this point, Crown Landing presented expert testimony to
show that the on-shore component met the definition of manufacturing. Id. at 5-6.
DNREC countered with expert testimony reaching the opposite conclusion. See id. at
6.
105. Id. at 7. This led the Board to conclude that "[tihe real sole purpose of the
proposed facility is to serve as a bulk product transfer facility." Id.
106. Id. at 10. The Board later noted that several parties had referred to a Janu-
ary 20, 1972 letter from the Delaware Attorney General concerning a status decision
about an LNG terminal proposed by El Paso Eastern Company. A copy of that letter
can be found in 1973 REPORT, supra note 2, at 103-04. In discussing the issue of
whether the LNG terminal would qualify under the single industrial or manufactur-
ing facility exception, the Attorney General stated:
It is my opinion that the El Paso Eastern terminal does not fit within the
'single industrial or manufacturing facility" exception .... The facts con-
tained in the letter from the El Paso Eastern Company indicate that the
LNG terminal in question is merely a way station in the natural gas
transportation system which El Paso Eastern is endeavoring to develop.
It is quite clear that the legislative intent was to permit docking facilities
where such facilities would benefit such industries as would be granted
permits to operate in the Coastal Zone. Here the situation is reversed.
The terminal will only exist as an adjunct to the docking facility. In other
words, the important part of the project to El Paso Eastern is not the
"industrial facility" but the docking facility.
Id. at 1. The Board quoted part of this excerpt and found that "a similar analysis
applies to the proposed Crown Landing construction." Crown Landing, CZ 2005-01,
at 10.
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quiring two completely separate facilities: a docking facility or
pier, and a manufacturing facility. By finding that the onshore
and offshore components of Crown Landing's proposal together
constituted a docking facility, the second necessary component of
facility was missing, and hence the exception could not apply.
C. Permitted Industrial or Manufacturing Uses
The third category of industrial development regulated under
the CZA is industrial uses that the Act allows to operate in the
industrial zone. While the Act initially describes this category as
"industrial development other than that of heavy industry in the
coastal zone of Delaware,"10 7 the section of the Act establishing
the permitting requirement describes it in two ways: as "manufac-
turing uses not in existence and in active use on June 28, 1971"108
or the "expansion or extension" of a previously permitted use or a
nonconforming use. 10 9 Thus, the Act requires a permit for "manu-
facturing uses" and any expansion or extension of a nonconform-
ing use or of a previously permitted manufacturing use.
What falls within the term "manufacturing use"? Although
the Act specifically defines eight terms, 110 it does not define the
term "use," despite the fact that it appears in numerous sec-
tions,"' and so determining whether something is a "manufactur-
107. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7001 (2007).
108. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7004. Given the language of § 7001 describing this
category as "industrial development other than that of heavy industry," it would seem
obvious that manufacturing which amounts to a heavy industry use should not be
able to qualify for a permit. The Board has rejected a claim that a chlorine bleach
plant was a "simple manufacturing use" because it found that the chlorine plant
would be heavy industry. See In re Appeal of Occidental Chem. Co., No. 259, at 13
(Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. July 29, 1992).
58 Del. Laws at 495 (1971).
109. Id. Originally, the Act only allowed "expansion" or "extension" of "non-con-
forming manufacturing uses." See 58 Del. Laws 490, 493 (1971). In other words,
heavy industry uses and bulk product transfer facilities that were nonconforming
uses could not expand. In 1992, the Act was amended to remove the "manufacturing"
limitation so that expansion or extension of all nonconforming uses would be permis-
sible. See 68 Del. Laws 1187 (1992). The notion of expansion of nonconforming uses
is discussed more completely infra Section II(D).
110. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7002 (a) (defining "coastal zone"); (b) (defining "non-
conforming use"); (c) (defining "environmental impact statement"); (d) (defining "man-
ufacturing"); (e) (defining "heavy industry use"); (f) (defining "bulk product transfer
facility"); (g) (defining "Board"); and (h) (defining "person").
111. Id. § 7002(b) (Nonconforming use "means a use, whether of land or a struc-
ture, which does not comply with the applicable use provisions of this chapter, where
such use was lawfully in existence and in active use.. ."); id. § 7002(c) (environmental
impact statement defined as detailed description of "effect of the proposed use on the
immediate and surrounding environment and natural resources"); id. § 7002(e)
25
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ing use" subject to § 7004(a) involves figuring out whether the
proposed industrial development involves "manufacturing." The
Act defines it in this way:
"Manufacturing" means the mechanical or chemical transforma-
tion of organic or inorganic substances into new products, char-
acteristically using power-driven machines and materials
handling equipment, and including establishments engaged in
assembling component parts of manufactured products, pro-
vided the new product is not a structure or other fixed
improvement. 112
Mechanical or chemical transformation are the key components.
Thus, for example, changing the sugar content and adding water,
peel oil, and essences to orange juice concentrate, 113 or pulverizing
built-up roofing to make new asphalt roofing shingles 1 4 involve
manufacturing requiring a CZA permit, while the mere dilution of
caustic soda solution with water,1 5 and the mere extraction and
purification of landfill gas do not.1 6 The 1999 Regulations do not
add to the Act's definition.11 7 Instead, they set forth certain "uses
(heavy industry use "means a use" characteristically involving specified size and
equipment); id. § 7003 (prohibiting "heavy industry uses"); id. § 7004(a) (allowing
"manufacturing uses" and expansion of "nonconforming uses" by permit and requiring
that "county or municipality having jurisdiction has first approved the use in question
by zoning procedures provided by law").
112. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7002(d).
113. See Letter from John E. Wilson, III, Sec'y, DNREC, to Walter C. Tuthill, Esq.,
representing Citrus Coolstore, Inc. (Dec. 8, 1983) (copy on file with author).
114. See Letter from John E. Wilson, III, Sec'y, DNREC, to John Rocco, Dir., Res.
Recovery Ass'n of Wilimington (July 1, 1986) (copy on file with author).
115. See Letter from John E. Wilson, III, Sec'y, DNREC, to Hugh McFadden, Plant
Manager, Chloromone Corp. (April 7, 1986) (copy on file with author).
116. See Letter from John E. Wilson, III, Sec'y, DNREC, to Douglas Nielsen, Vice
Pres., Wehran Energy Corp. (Feb. 5, 1985) (copy on file with author).
117. See 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. §§ 6.0-6.3 (1999). However, the 1999 Regula-
tions set forth certain "uses or activities [that] are permissible in the Coastal Zone by
permit" and provides the following list:
§ 6.1: construction of pipeline or docking facilities serving as offshore bulk
product transfer facilities if such facilities serve only one on-shore manu-
facturing or other facility. However, the materials transferred through
the pipeline or docking facility must be used as a raw material in the
manufacture of other products or be finished products being transported
for delivery in order to be permissible under the regulations.
§ 6.2: public sewage treatment or recycling plants.
§ 6.3: any new activity other than those listed in §§ 5.1-5.19 of the regula-
tions [see list supra note 70] that may result in any negative environmen-
tal impact on the factors found in DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7004(b),
including: environmental impact as defined in § 8.2.1-8.2.10 of the regu-
lations; economic effect of the project; aesthetic effect, such as impact on
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/2
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or activities [that] are permissible in the Coastal Zone by permit,"
without any indication that the list is comprehensive. 118
In determining whether manufacturing is involved, the Board
has held that the decision maker "must be able to look at the com-
plete use being made of the industrial development. That is to say
the [decision maker] must consider the facility as a whole in deter-
mining whether or not that portion of the facility to be constructed
within the Coastal Zone is, in fact, part of the manufacturing
use."1 19 Thus, a water pumping system in the coastal zone for a
proposed nuclear power plant could not be judged separately from
the facility's operation, 20 while a buried natural gas pipeline was
viewed separately because it was not "inextricably connected" to a
proposed turbine project that was the subject of a separate CZA
proceeding.121
The Act requires that the decision to issue a permit involve
consideration of several impacts or effects of the proposed use.
These impacts include:
Environmental Impacts. The list of issues to assess in con-
sidering environmental impacts is extensive. Obvious impacts,
such as air and water pollution, require consideration of proba-
ble pollution under both normal operating conditions as well as
during mechanical malfunction and human error. 122 Likely de-
the scenic beauty of the surrounding area; the number and type of sup-
porting facilities required; effect on neighboring land uses, including ef-
fect on public access to tidal waters, effects on recreational areas, and
effect upon adjacent residential and agricultural areas; and county/mu-
nicipal comprehensive plans for development or conservation.
The 1999 Regulations do not indicate if this list is comprehensive. See id.
118. See 7-100-101 Del. Code Regs. §§ 6.0-6.3.
119. In re Delmarva Power & Light Co., No. 421SD, at 3 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus.
Control Bd. July 3, 1974) (copy on file with author). The Board supported its conclu-
sion with the following observation:
The purpose and intent of the Coastal Zone Act would be rendered mean-
ingless if it were to be decided that only those elements of a facility which
were located within the coastal zone geographical area could be consid-
ered in determining whether or not a permit should issue. This is true
only where, as here, the industrial construction to be located within the
Coastal Zone is an essential and integral part of the facility as a whole.
Id. at 4.
120. Id. at 3-4. However, the Board also made clear that, in examining the envi-
ronmental impacts of the project, the focus should be limited to those aspects of the
facility which directly affect the coastal zone. Id. at 4.
121. In re Delmarva Power & Light Co. Claymont-Wilmington Natural Gas Pipe-
line, No. 217SD, at 6 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. July 22, 1988) (appeal of
the status decision by the Delaware Audubon Soc'y) (copy on file with author).
122. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. § 7004(b).
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struction of wetlands must be considered as well as destruction
of flora and fauna. 123 Less obvious impacts must also be consid-
ered, including impacts on drainage, flood control, land erosion,
and effects on surface, ground, and subsurface water resources
from operations, 124 as well as the "likelihood of generation of
glare, heat, noise, vibration, radiation, electromagnetic interfer-
ence and obnoxious odors."125 The addition of pollutants over
current levels can be enough to justify denial of a permit, 126
while a reduction in environmental impacts127 or the presence
of safety measures 128 can favor granting a permit. However,
"the Coastal Zone Act does not require that a project meet par-
ticular Clean Air Act standards to qualify for a State Coastal
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. See also in re Jacob Kreshtool, No. 221P, at 8, 10 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus.
Control Bd. July 22, 1988) (appeal from the Delmarva Power & Light Co. Gas Com-
bustion Turbine Permit Decision) (copy on file with author) (finding noise from new
gas turbines at power plant are a negative environmental impact, but requiring modi-
fication of permit condition to set a specific decibel level reading).
126. See in re Appeal of J-M Manufacturing Co., No. 165, at 5-6 (Del. Coastal Zone
Indus. Control Bd. Nov. 29, 1985) (copy on file with author) (affirming decision to
deny permit for PVC pipe plant because of likely increase in vinyl chloride monomers
emissions in a non-attainment area).
127. See Kearney v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., 2005 WL 3844219, at * 6-7
(Del. Super. March 18, 1985) (net positive effects from 219 tons per year (t/y) reduc-
tion in S02 emissions, elimination of 2,700 t/y of sodium sulfate wastes, and 30,000
gallons per day reduction in potable water consumption, as against increased emis-
sions of 12 t/y of NOX, 26.4 t/y of CO, and 11 t/y of acid mist, "show that offsets [i.e.
positives] exist which are clearly and demonstrably more beneficial than any harm
from the project"); In re Coastal Zone Permit 406P Issued to E.I. DuPont DeNemours
& Co., No. CZ 2003-02 & 03, at 4 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. Oct. 24, 2003)
(copy on file with author) (citing fact that proposed new sulfuric acid recovery facility
would have less overall air emissions than reconstructed old facility or what refinery
would have been able to legally produce under permit for old facility shows an overall
positive environmental effect); In re The Appeal of the Delaware Audubon Soc'y, No.
95-1, at 10 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. July 28, 1995) (copy on file with
author) (noting proposed expansion of bulk product transfer facility to handle other
products while reducing amount of oil off-loaded makes project "less hazardous than
its existing authority" in affirming permit issued for facility).
128. See E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., No. CZ 2003-02 & 03, at 4 (agreeing with
finding by Secretary that "the requirement of a detailed Process Safety Management
Program ... subject to DNREC's review prior to operation, represents a reasonable
consideration of the environmental impact of the proposed use during mechanical
malfunction and human error").
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Zone Act permit,"12 9 and the Board will not impose such stan-
dards in connection with reviewing a permit under the Act. 130
Economic Effects. This analysis focuses on what economic
good the proposed use will generate, including jobs and income
(i.e., wages and salaries) created by the project as well as the
likely tax revenues that would accrue to state and local govern-
ment. 13 1 Interestingly, the Act requires that the jobs and in-
come component of this effect be measured "in relation to the
amount of land required," 132 without any guidance as to what
relationships are better or worse for the permitting decision.
Aesthetic Effects. This analysis is relatively undefined-the
only example the Act gives is "impact on scenic beauty of the
surrounding area."133 Nevertheless, any impact that can be de-
scribed as "aesthetic" appears to be fair game.
Effects on Neighboring Land Uses. This analysis requires
consideration of how the project might affect such things as pub-
lic access to tidal waters, effects on recreational areas, and the
effects on adjacent residential and cultural areas.' 3 4
Effects on Local Land Use Plans. This analysis requires
consideration of the project's affect on any county or municipal
comprehensive plans. 135
Size Effects. This analysis requires consideration of the
"Number and type of supporting facilities required and the im-
pact of such facilities on all factors listed in this subsec-
129. In re Coastal Zone Permit 403P Issued to Sunoco, Inc., No. CZ 2003-01, at 8
(Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. Oct. 17, 2003) (copy on file with author) (re-
jecting argument that evaluation of proposed hydrogen sulfide processing unit at re-
finery under § 7004(b) requires project to achieve "lowest achievable emission rate" or
best available control technology" standards under Clean Air Act).
130. Id.
131. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7004(b)(2).
132. Id.
133. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7004(b)(3).
134. Id. § 7004(b)(5).
135. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7004(b)(6). Note that § 7004(a) specifically states
that "no permit may be granted under this chapter unless the county or municipality
having jurisdiction has first approved the use in question by zoning procedures pro-
vided by law." The Superior Court has ruled that this does not require that the appli-
cant have final zoning approval before it applies for a CZA permit, provided that there
is some evidence of likely approval by the zoning authority and the CZA permit in-
cludes an express condition tying its validity to obtaining a zoning permit. See Kear-
ney v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., 2005 WL 3844219 at * 6 (Del. Super. March
18, 1985) (advisory letter from County on zoning and fact that County had previously
approved sulfuric acid regeneration units at site, plus permit condition tying permit's
own validity to applicant obtaining full zoning permits once it finalizes a design plan,
held sufficient to satisfy § 7004(a)).
2008]
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tion"'136-something that would likely occur in conducting the
analyses under the other factors anyway.
In terms of these statutory factors, no one requirement neces-
sarily controls. As the Board put it:
A permitted use which is environmentally benign-that is
which meets applicable air, water and other environmental reg-
ulations-may be rejected because it would affect negatively
tourism or recreation, or impede access to wetlands or be aes-
thetically unacceptable. An economic development project
which raises serious concerns about the applicant's responsibil-
ity in meeting environmental regulations might be rejected. 137
The 1999 Regulations largely track the statutory language,
requiring a permit applicant to submit an Environmental Impact
Statement 138 that conducts the statutorily-required analyses of
the specified effects. 139 However, the 1999 Regulations add some
specificity to the required analyses. For example, in addition to
requiring the analysis of probable air, land, and water pollution,
the 1999 Regulations require the applicant to "provide a state-
ment concerning whether, in the applicant's opinion, the project or
activity will in any way result in any negative environmental im-
pact on the Coastal Zone."' 40 The 1999 Regulations also add three
requirements to the Environmental Impact Statement that are
not specifically listed in the Act:
"[A]n assessment of the project's likely impact on the
Coastal Zone environmental goals and indicators.' 14 1
These "goals and indicators" are not defined in the Regula-
tions-indeed, the Regulations indicate that they "shall be
developed by the Department after promulgation of these
regulations and used for assessing applications and deter-
mining the long-term environmental quality of the Coastal
Zone." 142 A Delaware Coastal Zone Environmental In-
136. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7004(b)(4).
137. In re Kreshtool, No. 176, at 9 (Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. Apr. 11, 1986)
(appeal of status decision dated Jan. 24, 1986 granting Crown Zellerbach Corp. a
coastal zone permit) (copy on file with author) (affirming decision to allow Crown
Zellerbach to add and operation four flexographic printing presses to its existing
operation).
138. 7-100-101 DEL. CODE DEL. REGS. § 8.1.3 (Weil 2007).
139. Id. § 8.2.
140. Id. § 8.2.1.
141. Id. § 8.2.2.
142. Id.
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dicators Technical Advisory Committee (EITAC) was
formed in 1999 and made recommendations to DNREC on
what the goals and indicators should be;143 while DNREC
adopted the goals, there is no evidence that DNREC
adopted or developed any indicators.'4
" Consider the effect of the proposed project on threatened
and endangered species. 45
" Information on "the raw materials, intermediate products,
byproducts and final products and their characteristics
from material safety data sheets (MSDS's) if available, in-
cluding carcinogenicity, mutagenicity and/or the potential
to contribute to the formation of fog."146
Perhaps the 1999 Regulation's most significant addition to
the permitted industrial use category is the requirement that a
permittee reduce negative environmental impacts through an "off-
set proposal."1 47 The requirement applies to any "activity or facil-
ity that will result in any negative environmental impact." 48 The
offset proposal must satisfy two important requirements: it "must
143. See DEL. COASTAL ZONE ENVTL. INDICATORS TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMM., EN-
VIRONMENTAL GOALS AND INDICATORS FOR DELAWARE'S COASTAL ZONE (March 1999),
http://www.dnrec.delaware.gov/Admin/CZA/Documents/eitacfinal doc.pdf. The rec-
ommended goals relate to improved air quality, improved water quality, protecting
habitat, land cover, aesthetics, and preserving and maintaining healthy living re-
sources. Id. at ii. Each goal has a set of indicators that is designed "to track progress
towards these goals." Id. For example, for the air quality goal, EITAC proposed "Air
Quality Indicators" consisting of an Ambient Air Indicator (a database of all informa-
tion on ambient air quality, air emissions from pollution sources, and trends in pollu-
tant loading), see id. at 21; Affected Populations Indicator (designed to identify at-risk
populations by looking at human health and plant impacts from pollutants), see id. at
21-22; Accidental Releases Indicator (compiling data from actual releases and esti-
mates of impacts from potential releases to develop vulnerability zones), see id. at 22;
and an Atmospheric Deposition Indicator (focused on compiling data via sampling
stations on concentrations of N0 3 ,NH4 , SO4 , and pH), see id.
144. On January 31, 2000, then-Secretary Nicholas DiPasquale signed a memo ap-
proving the four goals recommended by EITAC. See Memorandum from Sarah W.
Cooksey, Administrator, to Nicholas A. DiPasquale, Secretary of DNREC 2 (January
31, 2000) (copy on file with author). However, while DNREC's website page concern-
ing the Coastal Zone Act provides a link to the EITAC recommendation report, there
is nothing to indicate what (if anything) DNREC ultimately adopted. DNREC,
Coastal Zone Act Program, http://www.dnrec.delaware.gov/Admin/CZA/Pages/
CZAHome.aspx (select "Final Recommendations of the Environmental Indicators
Technical Advisory Committee") (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). Richard Fleming, the co-
chair of EITAC, has confirmed that DNREC never adopted or promulgated any in-
dicators. Telephone interview of Richard Fleming (April 23, 2007).
145. 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. § 8.2.9 (Weil 2007).
146. Id. § 8.2.10.
147. Id. § 9.0.
148. Id. § 9.1.1.
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more than offset the negative environmental impacts associated
with the proposed project or activity;" 149 and should be "well-de-
fined and contain measurable goals or accomplishments which can
be audited by the Department"150 properly presented in the appli-
cation. 51 Of these, the requirement that the negative environ-
mental impacts must be "more than offset" is by far the most
intriguing. The effect of "more than" offsetting negative environ-
mental impacts is that there be a net positive environmental im-
pact from the project. Properly applied, this requirement is a
revolutionary way to improve the coastal environment. However,
questions about its effectiveness have been raised. 52 The Secre-
149. Id. §§ 9.1.1, 9.1.2.
150. Id. § 9.1.4.
151. The Regulations specify that the offset proposal must provide sufficient infor-
mation to allow the Secretary to determine the adequacy of the proposal, including
such things as a qualitative and quantitative description of how the offset proposal
will more than offset the negative environmental impacts of the permitted facility, id.
§ 9.2.1; the details of how and when the proposal will be carried out, id. § 9.2.2; what
the environmental benefits from the offset proposal are, id. § 9.2.3; how the proposal
will impact attainment of the Department's environmental goals for the Coastal Zone,
id. § 9.2.4; any negative impacts associated with the offset project, id. § 9.2.5; scien-
tific evidence to support the claim that the proposal will produce its intended results,
id. § 9.2.6; and how success or failure of the proposal will be measured, id. § 9.2.7. To
assist applicants in identifying possible offset proposals, DNREC makes available a
report providing initial descriptions of 67 "potential Environmental Enhancement
projects that may be considered by applicants" for permits under the Act. See
DNREC, ENVIRONMENTAL ENHANCEMENT PROJECTS FOR DELAWARE'S COASTAL ZONE at
1 (August 2000), http://www.dnrec.delaware.gov/Admin/CZA/Documents/CZAEn-
hancements.pdf (Some examples of the projects listed are incentive programs for
clean burning fuels, community plant-a-tree projects, converting brownfields to open
space, emission trading outside the coastal zone, wildlife habitat restoration with spe-
cies reintroduction, farmland BMP work, conservation easements, noxious weed con-
trol, and septic maintenance and replacement projects.
152. The concerns relate primarily to the location and quantity of the benefits. As
to location, while the 1999 Regulations make clear that there is a preference for
projects that are within the Coastal Zone, occur in the same environmental medium
as the negative environmental impact it offsets, occurs at the same site as the facility
being permitted, and occur simultaneously with the implementation of the activity
giving rise to the need for an offset, 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. § 9.1.3 (Weil 2007),
offsets outside the coastal zone are possible. That leads to a concern about whether
the process will deliver the benefits envisioned. See May & Myers, supra note 17, at
22 ("the Regulation's allowance that environmental degradation that occurs in the
coastal zone may be "offset" by improvements outside of the zone-and theoretically
even outside of the State-may mean that permitted uses may not be as carefully
scrutinized as would otherwise be the case. Although it is a fair statement that envi-
ronmental improvements that occur outside of the coastal zone may lead to environ-
mental improvement within the zone, it is also fair to be skeptical about the degree to
which such association can be made, monitored, and enforced"). The quantity concern
arises from regulatory language suggesting that applicants who have undertaken
.past voluntary improvements" may be required to provided less of an offset. See 7-
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tary will review the offset proposal and make a preliminary deter-
mination about whether the proposal is sufficient. 153 All CZA
permits issued shall be contingent upon the applicant carrying out
the proposed offset, and the schedule for completion of the offset
shall be included as an enforceable condition of the permit. 54
D. Nonconforming Uses
The final category of industrial development recognized in the
CZA is nonconforming uses. The Act defines it as follows:
"Nonconforming use" means a use, whether of land or of a struc-
ture, which does not comply with the applicable use provisions
in this chapter where such use was lawfully in existence and in
active use prior to June 28, 1971.155
This definition therefore requires a use have two characteristics in
order to be considered a "nonconforming use." First, it must "not
comply" with the use provisions in the Act. This can only mean
one thing: that the use in question is a heavy industry use or a
bulk product transfer facility (in which case it does "not comply"
because it would be prohibited under § 7003 of the Act 56) or else
it is a manufacturing use that requires a permit which does not
have permit (in which case it does "not comply" because such uses
must have a permit under § 7004 of the Act). 157 In short, noncon-
forming uses are uses that would otherwise be prohibited under
the Act.158 Second, to be a nonconforming use under the Act, the
100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. § 9.1.2 ("Applicants who have undertaken past voluntary
improvements may be required to provide less of an offset than applicants without a
similar record of past achievements"). This discretion has been criticized. See May &
Myers, supra note 17, at 22 (DNREC's nearly unfettered discretion to allow an appli-
cant who has made past "voluntary improvement" to provide less of an offset is prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, it works in only one direction: While the Regulations
allow DNREC to reduce the amount of offset required because of past good deeds, it
does not allow the agency to increase offsets when an applicant has refused to make
such improvements, or has otherwise been a bad actor. Second, the Regulations are
silent on what constitutes "voluntary improvements." Conceivably, any environmen-
tal improvements that an applicant has made due to any Federal, State or Local re-
quirement, for example, could be considered for the reduced offset.).
153. 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. § 9.1.5.
154. Id. § 9.3.1.
155. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7002(b).
156. Id. § 7003.
157. Id. § 7004.
158. See In re Delaware Audubon Soc'y, No. 95-1, at 10 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus.
Control Bd. July 28, 1995) (appeal) (copy on file with author) ("The Board finds that
Oceanport's facility was in active use in 1971 by its predecessor, Texaco, and was
2008]
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otherwise prohibited use must have been "lawfully in existence
and in active use" prior to June 28, 1971 (the date Delaware en-
acted the CZA). Combining these two characteristics, the Act
views nonconforming uses as uses which would otherwise be pro-
hibited under the Act but for the fact that they were in existence
and active use at the time the Act was passed.
Nonconforming uses are especially important because, in
their original form, they are allowed to operate as they had at the
time of the Act's passage without any requirement for a permit:
"Any nonconforming use in existence and in active use on June 28,
1971, shall not be prohibited by this chapter . . . . "159 Thus, the
Act takes a hands off approach to nonconforming uses as they ex-
isted on June 28, 1971. This means that some heavy industry,
bulk product transfer facilities, and unpermitted manufacturing
facilities are allowed to operate in the Coastal Zone despite the
Act's prohibitions or limitations on such uses.
This apparent contradiction was explained, at least early on,
by reference to the corresponding notion of nonconforming uses
under zoning law. The Act originally did not allow for heavy in-
dustry nonconforming uses to expand, 160 and thus early interpre-
tations cited Delaware case law under zoning 161 and voiced the
expectation that nonconforming uses are expected to wither and
eventually die. 162 This zoning view of nonconforming uses under
the Act was, however, undermined by two developments. First,
nonconforming in that its handling of oil would otherwise have been prohibited in the
Coastal Zone"); 1984 REPORT, supra note 5, at 4-2, -3 (summarizing the March 6, 1979
Attorney General opinion as stating that, "[a] nonconforming use is a heavy industry
use or bulk product transfer facility which would otherwise be prohibited but which
was in lawful operation prior to and at the time of enactment" of the Act).
159. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7004(a).
160. The Act originally only allowed for the expansion of nonconforming manufac-
turing uses. See 58 Del. Laws 490, 493 (1971).
161. New Castle County v. Harvey, 315 A.2d 616 (Del. Ch. 1974).
162. See In re Fischer Enters., Inc., No. 192, at 7 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control
Bd. Oct. 28, 1986) (appeal of the status decision) (copy on file with author) ("it is clear
that the intent of 7 Del. C. sec. 7004(a) is not to allow any extension or expansion of a
nonconforming use without a permit. This embodies the traditional law about non-
conforming uses that they are allowed to exist with the idea that they will not grow
and will become smaller and eventually extinct by attrition"); In re Application of
Dunn Dev. Co., No. 127, at 7 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. 1981) (status de-
termination) (copy on file with author) (stating that intent of the Act "is to prohibit
new bulk product transfer facilities, see 7 Del. C. § 7001 [sic], and gradually eliminate
existing bulk product transfer facilities (and other nonconforming uses) through at-
trition, as with existing Delaware case law on nonconforming sage,"). See also 1984
REPORT, supra note 2, at 4-3 (summary of the August 6, 1981 Attorney General Opin-
ion: "in general, the ultimate extinguishment of nonconforming uses is an objective of
[Vol. 25
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soon after the passage of the Act, both the State Planner and the
Board recognized that some changes at heavy industry noncon-
forming uses needed to be allowed (especially when existing heavy
industry uses wanted to modify their facilities either for business
reasons or because of requirements for pollution control equip-
ment).163 To address the problem, the Board adopted a definition
of expansion or extension that focused on changes which signifi-
cantly increase production capacity, land use, or environmental
impact. 164 The effect of this definition was two-fold. The first was
that, during the 1971-1992 period before the Act was amended, at
least 75 changes to nonconforming uses out of a total of 212 pro-
posals reviewed by the permitting authority (or roughly 35% of all
status decisions) were found not to be expansions and therefore
found not subject to regulation under the Act. 165 The other effect
zoning ordinances. A rebuilding of [a] completely destroyed nonconforming structure
or facility would be contrary to this philosophy").
163. See CONTINENTAL SHELF REPORT, supra note 15, at 36; 1973 REPORT, supra
note 5, at 12-13.
164. See 1973 REPORT, supra note 5, at 99.
165. For examples of the 75 projects found not regulated, see 1973 REPORT, supra
note 5, at 18 (construction of carbon monoxide boiler and merox treatment plant to
remove organic sulfides at Getty Oil refinery); see also id. at 21 (construction of
Stretford Sulfur Recovery Unit to remove hydrogen sulfide at Sun Olin Chemical
Company plant in Claymont); id. at 27 (replacement of batch-type Sulfate Process
with Chlorine Process at E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company titanium dioxide
facility); id. at 30 (liquid carbon dioxide manufacturing facility at Sun Olin plant in
Claymont); id. at 30-31 (sulfur dioxide recovery plant at Getty Oil refinery in Dela-
ware City); id. at 33 (activated sludge wastewater treatment plant at Getty refinery);
id. at 36-37 (construction of atactic recovery unit at Amoco Chemicals Corporation
facility in New Castle); id. at 45 (modification to sulfuric acid alkylation plant at
Getty Oil's refinery); id. at 45-46 (wastewater treatment plant for ICI Americas Wil-
mington plant); 1977 REPORT, supra note 5, at 33 (modification of catalytic cracker
reactor at Getty Oil's refmery); id. at 34 (replacement of steam boilers at Stuaffer
Chemical PVC plant near Delaware City); id. at 35 (debottlenecking project to in-
crease polypropylene production at Amoco New Caste Polymer plant); id. at 38 (plant
improvements to increase sodium bisulfate production at Allied's Claymont plant); id.
at 41 (installation of hydrodesulferization unit and a hydrogen plant at Sul Oil's refin-
ery); id. at 42 (installation of equipment to increase PVC resin production at Diamond
Shamrock facility); id. at 43 (installation of 10,000 kW turbogenerator to increase
electric generating capacity at Getty Oil refinery); id. at 44 (installation of two flex-
ographic printing presses at Crown Zellerbach plant); id. at 49 (gas recovery system
at Amoco plant); id. at 50 (expansion of PVC paste production facility at Diamond
Shamrock's Delaware City facility); id. at 52 (expansion of wastewater treatment fa-
cility at Standard Chlorine of Delaware's facility); 1984 REPORT, supra note 5, at 3-2
(10,000 gallon liquid sulfur dioxide storage and handling system at Allied Chemical
Claymont plant); id. (Aromatics-150 recovery system and stack-scrubbing unit at
Getty Oil's refinery); id. (modification of sorbitol processing facility at ICI America's
New Castle plant); id. at 3-3 (modification of fractionation tower at Getty Oil's refin-
ery); id. (production facility modification at ICI Americas facility in New Castle even
35
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was that, when the Board actually considered the application of
its definition, it tended to view the concept of "expansion" in terms
of the types of activities conducted or that could have been con-
ducted at the nonconforming facility. Thus, In re Coastal Zone
Status Determination Regarding Application of Dunn Develop-
ment Co. allowed expansion of a nonconforming bulk product
transfer facility to include handling bulk coal transfers 166 because
it would not "substantially change the character of the facility as
it existed at the time the Act was adopted. 1 67 The transfer activ-
ity was the same-only the product being transferred was differ-
ent.168 But in a different case, the Board upheld a status decision
prohibiting the owner of an on-shore facility from engaging in ves-
sel-to-vessel transfers of liquid fertilizer in Delaware Bay because
this activity was not part of the use of the property granted non-
though 65% increase in production; "by itself a production capacity increase with no
significant environmental or land area increases does not necessarily justify a deter-
mination that a project is an expansion or extension); id. at 3-4 (petroleum storage
tanks at Getty Delaware City refinery); id. at 3-10 (molten sulfur unit at Allied Chem-
ical plant); id. at 3-10 - 3-11 (new plant to produce methanol at Getty refinery); id. at
3-11 (magnesium oxide regeneration facility at Allied Chemical plant); id. at 3-13
(Continuous Catalyst Regeneration Platforming Unit at Getty refinery); id. at 3-14
(reboiler units at Delmarva Edgemoor power plant); id. at 3-18 (production equipment
for new type of alumina gel at Barcroft Co. facility in Lewes).
166. In re Application of Dunn Dev. Co., No. 127.
167. Id. at 7. In justifying its decision, the Board cited the prohibition against bulk
product transfer facilities in § 7003 and the permission for nonconforming uses in
§ 7004 and stated:
The Board does not read this language to require a bulk product transfer
facility to remain static with the product being transferred always re-
maining the same; however, the Board does conclude that the word "use"
refers to the nature of the facility in existence on June 28, 1971 and
thereby limits future use of the facility to those operations which, both in
kind and quantity, could, in fact, have been performed in 1971. The
Board reads the Acting Director's reference to "change in character" in his
decision to mean that modification of the facility which would permit uses
or operations that could not be accomplished on June 28, 1971 are prohib-
ited . . The Board believes this analysis to be consistent with both the
intent of the act, which is to prohibit new bulk product transfer facilities,
see [DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7.] § 7001 (2007), and gradually eliminate ex-
isting bulk product transfer facilities (and other nonconforming uses)
through attrition, and with existing Delaware case law on nonconforming
usage, which provides that a new use differing in quality or character is
prohibited unless otherwise provided by statute. New Castle County v.
Harvey, 315 A.2d 616 ([Del. Ch.] 1974).
Id.
168. Id. at 4.
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conforming use status. 169 The Board in other cases looked at the
impacts from the facility. 170 The net effect of the Board's defini-
tion, however, was to undermine the notion that nonconforming
use was similar to nonconforming use under zoning law because
the definition was allowing facilities to continue to operate and
change with business conditions (instead of withering and dying).
The second blow to the applicability of the zoning notion of
nonconforming use was the 1992 amendment allowing all noncon-
forming uses to expand or extend upon obtaining a permit,171 for
the amendment clearly unlinked nonconforming uses under the
Act from at least the "wither and die" concept under zoning law.
In Kearney v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd.,172 a citizen chal-
lenged a CZA permit allowing DuPont to construct a new spent
acid regeneration (SAR) unit at the Delaware City, DE refinery to
replace a SAR unit that had suffered a catastrophic accident.1 73
The refinery, having operated since the 1950s, was a nonconform-
ing use, and the new SAR unit would be within the footprint of the
refinery. 174 The citizen argued that the CZA should be inter-
169. In re Fischer Enters., Inc., No. 192, at 5 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd.
Oct. 28, 1986) (appeal of status decision) (copy on file with author). The Board re-
jected an argument under Dunn Development, stating:
The Board concludes that the use proposed was not in existence and in
active use on June 28, 1971. Specifically, the Board concludes that there
was no such use at Big Stone Anchorage [a specific area in Delaware Bay]
prior to 1971 by [applicant], or anyone else .... Unlike Dunn Develop-
ment Company, Inc. in 1981 where a new product was going to be substi-
tuted for part of the capacity of the facility without changing the size or
character of the facility, here a new activity, namely vessel to vessel bulk
transfers at Big Stone Anchorage is planned, which operation was not in
existence and in active use in 1971 would be commenced. Accordingly,
the Board's decision in Dunn Development is inapposite.
Id. at 6-7.
170. The Board's decision, In re Coastal Zone Permit Determination of Getty Refin-
ing & Marketing Co., No. 123 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. January 27, 1981)
(copy on file with author), concerned a proposal by Getty Oil to build a methanol plant
at its then-existing facility in Delaware City. Because the existing facility was a non-
conforming use, the issue was whether the methanol plant was an expansion or exten-
sion of the nonconforming use requiring a permit. A 5-2 majority of the Board found
that no permit was necessary because "there will be no significant increase in feed-
stock use of the plant; there will be no significant increase in the land use area of the
proposed methanol plant; and that there will be no significant adverse environmental
impact from the operation of the methanol plant." Id. at 6.
171. See 68 Del. Laws 347 (1992).
172. 2005 WL 3844219 (Del. Super. Ct. March 18, 2005), affd, 897 A.2d 767 (Del.
2006).
173. Id. at *1.
174. Id. As explained infra, text accompanying notes 179-80, the 1999 Regulations
view "expansion or extension" in terms of the footprint of the nonconforming use. The
37
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preted under zoning principles, forcing undesirable land-uses out
of existence by forbidding them from being expanded, upgraded,
or transferred so that they "wither and die" away. 175 The Dela-
ware Superior Court rejected this argument because of the "exten-
sion or expansion" language of § 7004(a):
Even if Mr. Kearney's characterization of zoning is correct in a
general sense, it ignores the plain language of the Act. Section
7004(a) of the Act provides that "all expansion or extension of
nonconforming uses, as defined herein, and all expansion or ex-
tension of uses for which a permit is issued pursuant to this
chapter, are likewise allowed only by permit." Subsection (b)
provides that, when the Secretary makes a permitting decision,
he must consider, "Economic effect, including the number ofjobs
created and the income which will be generated by the wages
and salaries of these jobs in relation to the amount of land re-
quired, and the amount of tax revenue potentially accruing to
state and local government." . . .This language makes it clear
that the General Assembly did not intend to doom every ex-
isting, non-conforming use in the coastal zone to extinction by
attrition. Instead, the legislature clearly expects the Secretary
to make a judgment call on any proposed expansions, balancing
environmental and economic factors to reach the best result for
Delaware and its citizens.176
While the Act now allows "expansion or extension" of a non-
conforming use with a permit, the Act itself does not define what
an "expansion or extension" is. 177 The 1999 Regulations view it in
spatial terms (i.e., an increase of the "footprint" of the noncon-
forming use). 178
SAR unit would not increase the refinery's footprint, and thus it was not an "expan-
sion or extension."
175. Kearney, 2005 WL 3844219, at *5.
176. Id. at *5-6. While "wither and die" is no longer appropriate, other zoning
concepts might still apply. For example, nonconforming uses under zoning law are
preexisting uses that give rise to a property right. See, e.g., Outdoor Graphics, Inc. v.
City of Burlington, Iowa, 103 F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 1996); Toys R Us v. Silva, 676 N.E.2d
862 (N.Y. 1996); Morgan v. Callaway, 2003 WL 1387127, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. 2003)
("Once a non-conforming use is vested and continues, it runs with the land.") (citation
omitted); Johnson County Mem'l Gardens, Inc. v. City of Overland Park, 718 P.2d
1302 (Kan. 1986); Hager v. West Rockhill Tp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 795 A.2d 1104 (Pa.
Cmmw. Ct. 2002); In re Lashins, 807 A.2d 420 (Vt. 2002); Western Theological Semi-
nary v. City of Evanston, 156 N.E. 778 (Ill. 1927). Given the treatment of noncon-
forming uses under § 7004(a) of the Act, a similar conclusion results.
177. See 58 Del. Laws at 495 (1971).
178. The 1999 Regulation's approach is somewhat confusing. In 7-100-101 DEL.
CODE REGS. § 4.2 (Weil 2007), the Regulations indicate that "expansion of any non-
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Because of the special status of nonconforming uses under the
Act, this category of industrial activity under the Act has gener-
ated significant litigation. One important issue (and the subject of
a recent Board decision) is what a "use" is for purposes of deter-
mining whether that "use" is a "nonconforming use" under the
Act. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc. v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Natural Res.
& Envtl. Control 79 involved a request for status decision by Vane
Line Bunkering, Inc. to operate an oil lightering operation at the
Big Stone Anchorage in Delaware Bay in which crude oil and No.
6 fuel oil would be lightered (that is, transferred) from larger
ocean-going tankers to Vane Line's own vessels for delivery to
ports and refineries on the Delaware River. 180 The Secretary's
status decision held that the proposed oil lightering operation
would be a new bulk product transfer facility prohibited under the
Act.181 The Board reversed.' 8 2 It found that oil lightering as an
activity was being conducted by another entity at the time the Act
was passed.18 3 It framed the issue this way:
[T]he CZA is ambiguous to the extent its provisions are not en-
tirely clear whether an activity, such as oil lightering is a "non-
conforming use" or whether oil lightering constitutes a "bulk
product transfer facility." In other words, is the activity of oil
lightering defined by the CZA in terms of a "use" or in terms of
an entity engaged in the activity (i.e., the "user")? The CZA and
its regulations do not specifically define "use."u8 4
conforming uses beyond their footprint(s)" are a prohibited use or activity in the
Coastal Zone, where "footprint" is defined as "the geographical extent of non-con-
forming uses as they existed on June 28, 1971" and depicted in aerial photographs
that are included as Appendix B to the Regulations. See id. § 3.0. The flat prohibition
in § 4.2 would seem to be at odds with the language of DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7,
§ 7004(a) (2007), allowing "expansion or extension" of nonconforming uses with a per-
mit. However, in a later section describing uses requiring a permit, the 1999 Regula-
tions list "any new activity . .. by an existing heavy industry or a new or existing
manufacturing facility that may result in any negative impact" as "uses or activities
[that] are permissible in the Coastal Zone by permit." See 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGs.
§ 6.3.
179. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc. v. DNREC, No. CZ 2006-01, (Del. Coastal Zone
Indus. Control Bd. Dec. 1, 2006), rev'd, No. 06A-12-001-ESB (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 16,
2007) (copy on file with author).
180. Id. at 2.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 23.
183. Id. at 18.
184. Id. at 22.
20081
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The Board went on to find that the activity of oil lightering is
a nonconforming use so that Vane Line's proposed oil lightering
operation would simply be an extension or expansion of that non-
conforming use allowable under § 7004(a).18 5 The Board based its
conclusion on the fact that § 7002(b)'s definition of nonconforming
use speaks of "uses" rather than users,186 that the Third Circuit's
Norfolk Southern decision contained language suggesting that oil
lightering was a use that was grandfathered under the Act,' 8 7 and
that DNREC's failure to regulate oil lightering under the Act "cre-
ate[d] an inference which the Board finds persuasive and accepts,
that DNREC deemed oil lightering a grandfathered 'use,' rather
than a use permissible only when performed by a grandfathered
'user.'"188
That decision was appealed to the Superior Court by both
DNREC and the Delaware Nature Society,18 9 and in November
2007 the Superior Court reversed the Board's decision. 190 The
Court expressly rejected the Board's analysis:
There is nothing ambiguous about the three sections of the
Coastal Zone Act [§§ 7002(b), 7003, and 7004] that are applica-
ble to this case. The Board simply did not understand them.
Similarly, the Board's conclusions about Vane's proposed oil
lightering facility are wrong because they are contrary to the
plain language of the Coastal Zone Act, its regulations, and the
Supreme Court's holding in Coastal Barge.'91
185. Id. at 23.
186. Id. at 24.
187. Id. In the factual background section of its opinion, the Third Circuit con-
trasted the proposed coal lightering operation (which had never been done before in
Delaware Bay) with oil lightering (which had been done before). Norfolk S. Corp. v.
Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 391 (3d Cir. 1987). In a footnote, the Third Circuit stated: "Oil
lightering is not subject to the CZA ban because it was an existing use at the time of
the CZA's enactment and is thus covered by the grandfather provision." Id. at 391
n.3. Given that Norfolk Southern was a challenge to the Act under the dormant com-
merce clause of the United States Constitution, and therefore not required to inter-
pret the meaning of terms under the Act itself, it is at best unclear whether the Third
Circuit's words have any interpretive effect under the Act.
188. Vane Line, No. CZ 2006-01, at 24.
189. The author is part of a team of attorneys representing the Delaware Nature
Society in that appeal.
190. DNREC v. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc., No. 06A-12-001-ESB (Del. Super. Ct.
November 16, 2007) (copy on file with author).
191. Id. at 6.
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The Court ruled that "nonconforming use" can only refer to a facil-
ity, and not a general practice or activity;192 thus, because Vane
Line did not have a oil lightering facility in operation on June 28,
1971, it could not be a nonconforming use. 193
E. Procedures Under the CZA
The CZA and the Regulations issued thereunder contemplate
three distinct decision points for determining whether a particular
industrial development proposal can proceed under the Act.
Those three steps are: (1) Status Decisions before the full permit
process starts; (2) the Permit Process itself; and (3) Appeals from
the permit process. Each step has its own statutory and/or regula-
tory basis, and is independent of any other permitting
requirements. 194
1. Status Decisions Under the CZA
The CZA's provisions concerning application of the Act focus
primarily on permitting, setting forth general requirements for
permit applications 195 and empowering the Secretary to deter-
mine whether the proposed use is prohibited, regulated, or not
subject to the Act. 196 This makes logical sense; if heavy industry
192. Id. at 6-7.
193. Id. at 7-8.
194. See Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 907
(Del. 1994) ("There is no statutory requirement that a permit applicant obtain a
favorable CZA status decision before applying for Chapter 60 [Environmental Protec-
tion Act] permits. Similarly, when determining an applicant's status under the CZA,
there is no requirement that the applicant have any status with regard to Chapter 60
permits").
195. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7005 (2007) states:
All requests for permits for manufacturing land uses and for the expan-
sion or extension of nonconforming uses as herein defined in the coastal
zone shall be directed to the Secretary of the Department of Natural Re-
sources and Environmental Control. Such requests must be in writing
and must include (1) evidence of approval by the appropriate county or
municipal zoning authorities, (2) a detailed description of the proposed
construction and operation of the use and (3) an environmental impact
statement.
Under the Act as originally passed, applications were to be submitted to the State
Planner. See Kreshtool v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 310 A.2d 649, 651 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1973). The Act was amended in 1981 to vest this power in the Secretary of
DNREC. See 63 Del. Laws 425 (1981).
196. Section 7005 goes on to state:
The Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources and Environmen-
tal Control shall first determine whether the proposed use is, according to
this chapter and regulations issued pursuant thereto, (1) a heavy indus-
try use under § 7003 of this title; (2) a use allowable only by permit under
41
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and bulk product transfers are prohibited under the Act, then the
only area where there should be activity is in connection with uses
that can be permitted under § 7004. Yet waiting until the permit
process to determine that a use in fact qualifies for a permit places
an applicant in a difficult position. Given the general statutory
requirements for a permit application, an applicant must make a
significant investment without knowing whether the Secretary
will agree that the proposed use is permissible under the Act-an
investment that will be lost if the Secretary decides that the use is
in fact prohibited.
To address this problem, one of the first things the Board did
was to create a "status decision" process wherein the State Plan-
ner would "decide on the applicant's status under terms of the
[Act] prior to the full application . . .requiring detailed project
plans and an environmental impact statement."'197 This status de-
cision process has continued through the 1999 Regulations. Appli-
cants may request a status decision "to determine whether or not
the activity or facility is a heavy industry"198 or "to determine
whether or not the proposed activity requires a Coastal Zone per-
mit."199 While these provisions of the Regulations make the Re-
quest appear voluntary, the Regulations require a Request for
Status Decision for "any new manufacturing facility or research
and development facility proposed to be sited in the Coastal
Zone."200 The applicant submits a Request for Status Decision in
writing that requires applicant and site identifying information, a
§ 7004 of this title; or (3) a use requiring no action under this chapter.
The Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources and Environmen-
tal Control shall then, if he or she determines that § 7004 of this title
applies, reply to the request for a permit within 90 days of receipt of the
said request for permit, either granting the request, denying same, or
granting the request but requiring modifications; the Secretary shall
state the reasons for his or her decision.
DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7005. As noted, see supra note 195, this power originally
resided in the State Planner.
197. 1973 REPORT, supra note 5, at 7-8 (describing Board's decision at September
13, 1971 meeting).
198. 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. at § 7.1 (Weil 2007).
199. Id. § 7.2.
200. Id. § 7.4 (requiring any new manufacturing facility or R & D facility proposed
for the Coastal Zone "shall apply for a status decision"). In addition, the Secretary
can ask that a person submit a Request for Status Decision if the Secretary "has cause
to suspect an activity within the confines of the Coastal Zone is prohibited or should
receive a permit." Id. § 7.5. Failure to respond to the Secretary's request subjects the
person to the enforcement provisions under the Act and Regulations. Id. These in-
clude cease and desist orders, DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7009, injunctions by the Court
of Chancery, id. § 7011, and civil penalties up to $50,000 for each offense. Id. § 7010.
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detailed description of the proposed activity,201 and an "impact
analysis" that examines the impact of the project under six differ-
ent factors.20 2 Once the Request is deemed administratively com-
plete, the Secretary must publish legal notice advising the public
of the Request and allow ten business days for public comment. 20 3
The Secretary has fifteen business days thereafter to make a deci-
sion about the status of the project under the Act. 20 4
2. The CZA Permit Process
The Act itself says little about the process for getting a permit
(beyond § 7004(b)'s articulation of the six factors that the Secre-
tary must consider), and thus it is the Regulations that spell out
the permitting process. Applicants must complete and submit an
application form provided by DNREC. 20 5 The Regulations spell
out minimum contents for the application, including a certifica-
tion about the completeness and accuracy of the application, 20 6 ev-
idence of local zoning approval, 20 7 an Environmental Permit
Application Background Statement (if required),20 8 an Environ-
201. 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. §§ 7.3.1-7.3.3.
202. Id. §§ 6.3.1-6.3.6. These factors are: environmental impacts, economic effect,
aesthetic effect, number and type of supporting facilities and the separate impacts of
those facilities, effect on neighboring land uses, and interaction with the county or
municipal comprehensive plans. These factors mirror the factors that the Secretary
must consider when reviewing a permit application. See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7,
§ 7004(b). Although these factors suggest a detailed analysis akin to a permit appli-
cation, the form for Status Decision Requests issued by DNREC suggests that the
analysis is more summary in nature, requiring only a "detailed statement" of the im-
pacts. See DNREC, Coastal Zone Act Program, http://www.dnrec.delaware.gov/Ad-
min/CZAIPages/CZAHome.aspx (click on "Coastal Zone Status Decision Application")
(last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
203. 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. § 7.6.
204. Id. § 7.7.
205. Id. § 8.1. The application is available at DNREC, Coastal Zone Act Program,
http://www.dnrec.delaware.gov/Admin/CZA/Pages/CZAHome.aspx (select "Coastal
Zone Permit Application") (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
206. See § 8.1.1.
207. See id. § 8.1.2. This satisfies the requirement in the Act that "no permit may
be granted under this chapter unless the county or municipality having jurisdiction
has first approved the use in question by zoning procedures provided by law." DEL.
CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7004(a).
208. See 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. § 8.1.3. Environmental Permit Application
Background statements are required annually under § 7902. They must contain in-
formation on the officers, directors, and major shareholders of the company, informa-
tion on notices of violation, criminal and civil proceedings for violation of
environmental permits, laws or regulations, and whether the company, having been
designated a chronic violator under § 7904, has implemented policies, programs, and
procedures designed to detect, deter, and correct violations of the law. The purpose
behind requiring the statement is "to ensure that the State has adequate information
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mental Impact Statement,20 9 descriptions of the project's effects
under the § 7004(b) factors other than environmental impact,210
and an offset proposal if required under the regulations.211
Once submitted, the Regulations dictate how DNREC and the
Secretary review and process the application. First, DNREC must
determine that the application is administratively complete. 21 2 If
it is not complete, DNREC has the ability to request additional
information; if it is complete, DNREC must so notify the appli-
cant. 213 Next, the Secretary must consider how the project affects
the six § 7004(b) factors,214 the environmental goals and indica-
tors for the Coastal Zone, 215 and the sufficiency of the offset propo-
sal,216 and generate a written assessment of these issues that is
provided to the applicant and made available to the public.217 A
public hearing on the application must be held,218 with the public
able to comment but not necessarily as parties, 21 9 and the
about the background of applicants or regulated parties for the purposes of processing
permits and conducting other regulatory activities .... " DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7,
§ 7901.
209. 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. § 8.1.4. The requirements of the Environmental
Impact Statement are discussed supra Section II.C.
210. 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. §§ 8.1.5-8.1.9.
211. See id. § 8.1.10. The requirements of the offset proposal are discussed supra
Section II.C.
212. See id. § 8.3.1.
213. Id.
214. Id. § 8.3.2.
215. Id. § 8.3.3.
216. Id. § 8.3.4.
217. Id. § 8.3.4.
218. Id. § 8.3.5.
219. See In re Coastal Zone Permit 406P Issued to E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.,
No. CZ 2003-02 & 03, at 6-7 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. Oct. 24, 2003)
(copy on file with author) (applying the Administrative Procedures Act, DEL. CODE
ANN. TIT. 29, § 10101 (2007), definition of party, "it seems that only the applicant is a
party entitled to all the protections of due process during the review of the permit
application unless another person or agency (1) properly seeks to be admitted as a
party and (2) shows a right to be so admitted. Clearly, showing up and speaking at
the public hearing is insufficient to confer party status"). In Kearney, which affirmed
the Board's conclusions in E.L DuPont DeNemours, the Superior Court explained that
this conclusion makes sense because:
The reason for this restriction is obvious; during the initial stages of a
permit application, it is essential for DNREC to keep an open dialogue
with the applicant so that agency's concerns can be quickly addressed.
This back-and-forth often occurs through phone calls with agency staff,
comments at site visits, or an exchange of emails. If everyone who attends
a public hearing were to become a party during the permitting process,
this simple, efficient exchange would be compromised. Instead, every pro-
posed design change or Agency suggestion would have to be made in writ-
ing or memorialized, reviewed by counsel, and served upon a multitude of
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/2
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Secretary must decide to grant or deny the permit.220
3. The CZA Appeals Process
The CZA contemplates two levels of appeals for decisions
under the Act.
Appeals to the Coastal Zone Industrial Control Board
In the first instance, any person who is "aggrieved" by a final
decision of the Secretary under the Act may appeal to the Coastal
Zone Industrial Control Board within 14 days of the announce-
ment of the decision. 221 The Board consists of nine voting mem-
bers-five appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the state
Senate subject to certain statutory constraints, and four from
specified state or local agencies. 222 The Act gives the Board broad
powers in its review of a decision under the Act:
The Board may affirm or reverse the decision of the Secretary of
the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Con-
trol with respect to applicability of any provisions of this chapter
to a proposed use; it may modify any permit granted by the Sec-
retary of the Department of Natural Resources and Environ-
semi-interested parties, who then could seek discovery, all of which would
bog down the permit process.
Kearney v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., No. C. A. 03A-11-008JRJ, 2005 WL
3844219, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. March 18, 2005). The Court also found that the
restriction:
is especially logical because members of the public with a negative view of
a project will have a complaint only if the Secretary decides to grant a
permit. Affording them party status before then would slow the process
for permits that will ultimately be denied, a tremendous waste of Agency
resources. It will also hamper consideration of environmentally friendly,
clearly meritorious applications in order to placate the ever-present
"NIMBY" bloc, who could be easily disposed during appeal on standing
grounds.
Id. at *8.
220. 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. § 8.3.6.
221. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7007(b). The Regulations underscore this point: "If
no appeal is received within the 14-day appeal period following the date of the publi-
cation of the legal notice, the decision becomes final and no appeal will be accepted."
§ 8.3.7.
222. See § 7006(a) (specifying that, for the 5 appointed and confirmed members
[no more than 2 of the regular members shall be affiliated with the same political
party" and "[a]t least 1 regular member shall be a resident of New Castle County, 1 a
resident of Kent County and 1 a resident of Sussex County, provided that no more
than 2 residents of any county shall serve on the Board at the same time," while the
additional 4 members are mandated to be the Director of the Delaware Economic De-
velopment Office, and the chairpersons of the planning commissions of each county").
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mental Control, grant a permit denied by the Secretary, deny a
permit or confirm the Secretary's grant of a permit. Provided,
however, that the Board may grant no permit for uses prohib-
ited in § 7003 herein. 223
In short, the Board can affirm or reverse status decisions, and can
affirm, reverse, or modify a permit decision. The Act requires the
Board to hold a public hearing and render its final decision in the
form of a final order within sixty days of receipt of an appeal. 224
The ability of the Board to act depends upon a "majority" of the
"total membership:"
Any member of the Board with a conflict of interest in a matter
in question shall disqualify himself or herself from considera-
tion of that matter. A majority of the total membership of the
Board less those disqualifying themselves shall constitute a
quorum. A majority of the total membership of the Board shall
be necessary to make a final decision on a permit request.225
In Shields v. Keystone Cogeneration Systems, Inc.,226 the Superior
Court had to untangle the meaning of these terms. Shields in-
volved a CZA permit issued to Keystone allowing the construction
of a pier and water intake facility on the Delaware River that
would service an electrical generation facility located in New
Jersey.227 Opponents of the project appealed to the Board, which
had only five members present, four of whom voted to sustain the
permit issuance and one voting for remand.228 The Board there-
fore believed that it was unable to render a "final decision" under
223. Id. § 7007(a).
224. Id. § 7007(b).
225. Id. § 7006.
226. 611 A.2d 502 (Del. Super. Ct. 1991).
227. Id. at 503-04.
228. Id.
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the Act, 2 2 9 thereby leaving the status of the permit and the appeal
up in the air. 230
The Superior Court made several rulings that clarify the na-
ture of the Board process. First, the court ruled that the four ab-
sent Board members should not be considered "disqualified"
merely by their absence (so that the "total membership" by which
one determines a "quorum" would have been five). 231 Second, the
court held that "total membership" in both sentences of § 7006
had the same meaning: the total number of members who were
not disqualified. 232 Given that the mere absences of the four
members were not viewed as disqualifications, that meant that
the agreement of five Board members (a majority of the nine total
members) was needed to render a final decision.233 Because only
four had voted to sustain (or affirm) the permit issuance, there
was no valid "final decision" of the Board. 234 That, of course, cre-
ated a problem: the Board had not ruled within the sixty-day win-
dow provided in § 7007, and so the Shields court needed to
articulate a way to reach a decision when, as it put it, "the statu-
tory procedure has failed."235 Finding that it still had jurisdic-
tion,236 the Shields court ruled that it would decide the appeal
229. Id. at 504. The Shields court cites the following language from the minutes of
the Board's meeting:
[Tihe Coastal Zone Act at [title 7, section] 7006 [of the Delaware Code]
requires that a "final decision" may be reached only bye [sic] a majority of
the Board members. The quorum for the Hearing was a simple majority of
five members. The Board being unable to reach a unanimous decision, no
"final decision" was reached.
Id. The actual order issued by the Board stated, "Following its deliberations, the
Board was unable to reach a final decision by a vote of a majority of the Members of
the Board, as required by [DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7006]." In re Keystone Cogenera-
tion Sys., Inc. (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., Nov. 22, 1991) (copy on file with
author).
230. See Shields, 611 A.2d at 504.
231. Id., 611 A.2d at 504. The court commented: "The record contains no indica-
tion that any of the four absent members were absent because of disqualification for
conflict of interest. Experience with public agencies does not support an inference that
a member's absence on a particular occasion is caused by disqualification." Id.
232. Id. at 505.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 507.
236. The Appellants had argued-perhaps with some justification-that the lack
of a final decision by the Board meant that the Superior Court did not have jurisdic-
tion (as only persons aggrieved "by a final order" of the Board can appeal under title 7,
section 7008 of the Delaware Code). The Shields court rejected this "technical" argu-
ment and justified its jurisdiction as follows:
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based on the record created before the Secretary and the Board. 237
However, the decision on the merits was apparently left for an-
other day, as the opinion does not decide the merits. 238
Appeals to the Superior Court
After review by the Board, the Act allows persons "aggrieved"
by the Board's decision to appeal that decision to the Superior
Court.239 In addition, the Secretary can appeal "any modification"
of his or her ruling.240 Appeals to the Superior Court must be filed
within twenty days "following announcement of the Board's deci-
sion."241 The Superior Court's consideration of the appeal is lim-
ited to the record before the Board and to the issue of "whether the
Board abused its discretion in applying standards set forth by this
chapter and regulations issued pursuant thereto to the facts of the
particular case."242 Given this language, courts tend to apply a
deferential standard of review. 243
This technical argument overlooks the fact that the Board is not confined
to affirming or reversing the Secretary's decision but is empowered to
modify any permit or grant a permit denied by the Secretary. In the exer-
cise of its powers, each member of the Board is entitled to assert his or
her own position concerning the granting or denial of a permit or the re-
strictions to be incorporated in the permit. In view of the variety of alter-
natives, a majority may not support one particular form of relief even if
all members participate. In that case, the Court is called upon to resolve
the appeal based on accepted principles.
Id. at 505.
237. Id. In support, the Shields court relied upon Hopson v. McGinnes, 381 A.2d
187, 189 (Del. 1978), in which the Delaware Supreme Court found that an appeal
from a matter in which the State Personnel Commission had failed to obtain a major-
ity vote involving discharge of an employee of the Division of Adult Corrections could
be handled by the Superior Court making its own determinations based on the record.
Shields, 611 A.2d at 505. Because there is no final decision to give deference to, the
Superior Court need not apply the deferential standard of review but rather can make
its own findings. Id..
238. It is the author's understanding that the parties reached a settlement,
thereby obviating the need for a decision on the merits. The Keystone facility was in
fact built.
239. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7008 (2007).
240. Id.
241. Id. This raises a potential problem for appellants. If the Board votes at the
public hearing and reaches a result, the language suggests that the 20 day clock
starts running. However, the Board's "final order" explaining its decision may or may
not come out during that 20 day period (depending on how much of the sixty days the
Board has left at the time of the public hearing).
242. Id.
243. See Kreshtool v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 310 A.2d 649, 652 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1973) ("Although the reviewing court's inquiry into the record is to be searching
and careful, the ultimate standard that it must apply is a normal appellate one. Re-
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/2
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F. General Issues Under the Act
Although not related to particular provisions of the Act, three
general issues concerning the Act must be discussed. The first re-
lates to the constitutionality of the Act; the second, to issues of
standing under the Act; and the third, to whether "uses" can be
abandoned.
1. Is the Act Constitutional?
Despite the Act's far-reaching effects, there has been only one
court challenge to the Act's constitutionality. After losing their
case under the Act in Coastal Barge, the proponents of the coal
lightering operation challenged the Act as violating the dormant
Commerce Clause. The challenged failed in both the District
Court 2 4 4 and Third Circuit, 245 albeit for different reasons. The
District Court, finding issues of material fact under the Pike bal-
ancing test,246 held that the process of review and approval of the
Act by the Secretary of Commerce under the federal Coastal Zone
Management Act 247 evidenced express congressional consent to
the Act under the Commerce Clause, thereby insulating the Act
from a constitutional challenge based on the Clause. 248 The Third
versal is warranted if the administrative agency exercised its power arbitrarily, or
committed an error of law, or made findings of fact unsupportable by substantial evi-
dence. It is immaterial whether the reviewing court would have reached a contrary
conclusion from the same evidence.") (citations omitted).
244. Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly (Norfolk 1), 632 F. Supp 1225 (D. Del. 1986), affd
822 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1987).
245. Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly (Norfolk 11), 822 F.2d 388, 390 (3d Cir. 1987).
246. The Pike balancing test refers to the test articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970):
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent
of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of
the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. (citation omitted). The District Court rejected arguments to apply stricter and
more deferential review, see Norfolk I, 632 F. Supp. 1234-42, finding them "uncon-
vincing," id. at 1242, and instead found Pike "properly applies." Id. at 1234. The
District Court found, however, that there were disputes as to the burdens on com-
merce and the putative local benefits and therefore summary judgment was inappro-
priate under Pike. Id. at 1243.
247. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-65 (2001).
248. Norfolk I, 632 F. Supp. at 1250. The District Court cited to South-Central
Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 104 (1984), and Western & S. Life Ins. Co.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 654 (1981), to support the proposition that
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Circuit rejected the District Court's consent theory,249 but af-
firmed because it found that, under the Pike test,250 the Act put no
discriminatory burden on interstate commerce (i.e., a burden not
shared by in-state entities). 251 Thus, the Act is constitutional
under the dormant Commerce Clause. 252
2. Standing Under the Act
One judicial decision impacts the issue of standing to chal-
lenge decisions under the Act: Oceanport Industries, Inc. v. Wil-
mington Stevedores, Inc.253
Oceanport involved a petroleum tank farm located in the
coastal zone that had operated since 1905.254 Oceanport Indus-
tries acquired the site and, in addition to continuing to handle
bulk quantities of petroleum, sought state permission to use the
site for off-loading bulk quantities of such things as road salt,
crushed stone, and cement, while reducing the quantity of oil
products stored at the facility. 255 Oceanport requested a status
decision, arguing that the proposed operation either fell within
the single industrial facility exception of the definition of bulk
product transfer facility in § 7002(f) or that the historic operation
of handling bulk quantities of products at the site gave rise to a
nonconforming use exempt from regulation under the Act. 256 The
Secretary determined that the site was a nonconforming use and
that the proposed operations were not a significant expansion or
"[t]he congressional power to consent to otherwise impermissible state regulation of
interstate commerce must be exercised expressly," Norfolk I, 632 F. Supp. at 1244.
249. Norfolk H, 822 F.2d at 392-98. The Third Circuit found that the Coastal Zone
Management Act did not, on it face, "expand state authority to legislate in ways that
would otherwise be invalid under the Commerce Clause," id. at 394-95, and had legis-
lative history which "does not convey an 'unmistakably clear' Congressional intent to
confer added authority on the states," id. at 396, leading the court to find no Congres-
sional consent to the Act under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 398.
250. The Third Circuit provided an extensive analysis on why a strict scrutiny re-
view was inappropriate, Norfolk H, 822 F.2d at 400-05, and a perfunctory analysis on
why a deferential review was inappropriate as well. Id. at 405. By process of elimina-
tion, that left the Pike balancing test as "appropriate in this case." Id.
251. Norfolk H, 822 F.2d at 405-07.
252. For a more detailed discussion of the two Norfolk Southern decisions and the
dormant Commerce Clause issues raised by them, see Carolyn Cunningham, Note &
Comment, Norfolk Southern v. Oberly: Coastal Protection Wins in Delaware, 4 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 439 (1987).
253. 636 A.2d 892 (1994).
254. Id. at 896.
255. Id. at 897.
256. Id.
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extension (that would otherwise require a permit).257 No one ap-
pealed the Secretary's status decision, 258 and thus the application
of the Act was not directly at issue in Oceanport.
The case itself arose from three permits Oceanport sought for
the project: a permit to undertake pier improvements in subaque-
ous lands, required by Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 7205; an air dis-
charge permit for fugitive emissions under Del. Code Ann. tit. 7,
§ 6003; and a storm water discharge permit under Del. Code Ann.
tit. 7, § 6003.259 After the Secretary issued the permits, Wilming-
ton Stevedores appealed these permits to the Delaware Environ-
mental Appeals Board (EAB).260 The EAB dismissed the appeal
on the basis that Wilmington Stevedores lacked standing to chal-
lenge the permit. 261 On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the
EAB, finding Wilmington Stevedores had standing, and remand-
ing the case back to the EAB with instructions to remand the mat-
ter back to the Secretary to review the status of the project under
the CZA.262 An interlocutory appeal to the Delaware Supreme
Court followed.
The Oceanport court considered the issue of standing, both
from the perspective of injury to Wilmington Stevedores itself as
well as injury to Wilmington Stevedores' members (i.e., organiza-
tional standing). To determine if Wilmington Stevedores suffered
its own injury sufficient to create standing, the court applied a
test it had previously derived from the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Assoc. of Data Processing Serv. Org. v.
Camp:263 "[t]he test of standing is whether: 1) there is a claim of
injury-in-fact; and 2) the interest sought to be protected or regu-
lated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."264
To determine injury-in-fact, the Oceanport court looked to the
then-recent decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife265 to find
that the injury must be "concrete and particularized" and "actual
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 898.
260. Id. The Environmental Appeals Board hears appeals of air and stormwater
discharge permit decisions by the Secretary pursuant to title 7, section 6008 of the
Delaware Code and subaqueous lands permit decisions pursuant to section 7210.
DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, §§ 6008, 7210 (2007).
261. Oceanport, 636 A.2d at 898-99.
262. Id.
263. 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970).
264. Oceanport, 636 A.2d at 900 (quoting Gannett Co., Inc. v. State, 565 A.2d 895,
897 (1989)).
265. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
2008]
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and immediate."266 For Wilmington Stevedores, this formulation
proved fatal. The claimed environmental injuries-arising out of
an interest in water quality and protection from fugitive air emis-
sions 267-failed because it lacked proof to show that the injuries
would "affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual man-
ner."268 The claimed economic injuries, arising from potential
shipping accidents that would close the River,269 while satisfying
the injury-in-fact prong,270 failed the zone of interest prong be-
cause "the goal of the relevant statutes is the protection of the en-
vironment"271  and not Wilmington Stevedores' economic
interests. 272 As for organizational standing, the Court cited the
three-part test of Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising
Comm'n,273 and found that Wilmington Stevedores did not show
that its members would themselves have standing.274
At first glance, Oceanport does not appear to apply directly to
the CZA. The permits at issue were under Delaware's Environ-
mental Protection Act 275 and Subaqueous Lands Act. 276 In addi-
tion, the Court's standing analysis focused on the fact that both
statutes allow appeals by persons "substantially affected" by the
Secretary's or EAB's decision,277 while the Act allows appeals by
266. Oceanport, 636 A.2d at 904 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 905.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 905-06.
271. Id. at 906.
272. Id. The Court went on to state:
Reading the statutes as a whole, it would contravene the basic legislative
intent to confer standing to challenge decisions made under those stat-
utes based upon the sole claim of economic injury. Had WSI sufficiently
asserted its environmental injury, or satisfied the elements of organiza-
tional standing, then the result might well be different. But WSI has not
done so.
Id.
273. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). Hunt allows an organization to sue on behalf of its mem-
bers if 1) the interests to be protected by the suit are germane to the organization's
purpose; and 2) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the partic-
ipation of individual members; and 3) the organization's members would otherwise
have standing. Id. at 342-43.
274. Oceanport, 636 A.2d at 902-03 n.13. The Court found two problems: WSI had
failed to raise the issue in the court below, and that even if it had, there was no proof
(via affidavits or otherwise) that members actually use the River and would be af-
fected by the Secretary's decision.
275. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, §§ 6001-99 (2007).
276. Id. §§ § 7201-17.
277. See id. §§ 6008, 7210.
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persons "aggrieved" by a final decision of the Secretary.278 How-
ever, the Data Processing-based two-part test and the Lujan-
based three-part test for injury-in-fact, first articulated in
Oceanport continue to be the tests for standing in Delaware in a
wide variety of contexts.2 7 9 Likewise, Oceanport's test for organi-
zational standing governs that issue.280 Further, Oceanport con-
tains references to the Act that can help in applying the Data
Processing test to claims under the Act.28 ' It is therefore likely
that Oceanport provides important guidance on the issue of stand-
ing under the Act. 28 2
278. See id. § 7007 (appeals to Board) and § 7008 (appeals to Superior Court). At
least one court has found that standing granted to persons "aggrieved" means that
Oceanport does not dictate the requirements of standing. See Swann Keys Civic Ass'n
v. Bd. of Adjustment of Sussex County, 2001 WL 167869, at *2-3 (Del. Super. Ct.
January 23, 2001) (standing of homeowners' association to challenge variance for set-
back requirement governed by four-part test in Vassallo v. Penn Rose Civic Assoc.,
429 A.2d 168, 170 (Del. 1981)). But see Harvey v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Odessa,
2000 WL 33111028, at *6-7 (Del. Super. Ct. November 27, 2000) (using principles
from Oceanport to find that petitioner was "aggrieved" by zoning board decision so as
to have standing).
279. See, e.g., Dover Historical Soc'y v. City of Dover Planning Comm'n, 838 A.2d
1103, 1111 (Del. 2003); General Motors Corp. v. New Castle County, 701 A.2d 819,
823-24 (Del. 1998); B.F. Rich Co., Inc. v. Gray, 2006 WL 3337163, at *8 n.80 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 9, 2006); O'Neill v. Town of Middletown, 2006 WL 205071, at *28 (Del. Ch. Jan.
18, 2006); Eastern Shore Envtl., Inc. v. Delaware Solid Waste Auth., 2004 WL
440414, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2004); Cave v. New Castle County Council,
2003 WL 21733076, at *2 n.23 (Del. Super. Ct. July 21, 2003); Motiva Enters. LLC v.
Sec'y of DNREC, 745 A.2d 234, 246-48 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999); Citizen's Coal., Inc. v.
County Council of Sussex, 1999 WL 669307, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. July 22, 1999); Breslin
v. Richard, 1994 WL 1892113, at *5-6 (Del. Super. Ct. July 22, 1994).
280. See, e.g., Comm. of Merchants & Citizens Against Proposed Annexation, Inc.
v. Longo, 669 A.2d 42, 44 (Del. 1995); Citizen's Coal., Inc. v. County Council of Sussex,
1999 WL 669307, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. July 22, 1999).
281. For example, the Oceanport court noted that:
In the context of the Coastal Zone Act, [DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7,]
88 7001-7013 [(2007)], and the Subaqueous Lands Act, [tit. 7, §§] 7201-
7216, under review here, the future occurrence of environmental degrada-
tion is clearly within the zone of interest sought to be protected by the
acts. The Coastal Zone Act, [tit. 7,] § 7001, states as its purpose the pro-
tection of the coastal zone. Likewise, the Subaqueous Lands Act, [tit. 7,]§ 7201, states as its purpose the protection of subaqueous lands against
use or change not in the public interest. It would be inconsistent to ex-
clude the future occurrence of events from the scope of these acts, because
one cannot prevent environmental degradation after it has already oc-
curred. Thus, WSI's claims relating to present or future injuries under
the relevant laws are within the zone of interest as enunciated in the
Data Processing test.
Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 903 (1994).
282. See In re Coastal Zone Permit 403P Issued to Sunoco, Inc., No. CZ 2003-01, at
6 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. Oct. 17, 2003) (copy on file with author) ("Mr.
Kearney testified that he lives, works and engages in recreational activities in loca-
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3. Can a Use Be Abandoned?
A use allowed under the Act (because it is a nonconforming
use under § 7003 or a permitted use under § 7004) obtains a sta-
tus that should protect the use throughout its existence. What
happens, though, if the facility stops operating? Can its protective
status be lost via abandonment?
The Act itself is silent on this direct point, though it gives a
hint that abandonment is possible. In 1984, as part of a rescue
package to keep the Phoenix Steel Corporation's steel manufac-
turing plant open, the General Assembly amended § 7004 to in-
clude the following language: "A basic steel manufacturing plant
in operation on June 28, 1971, may continue as a heavy industry
use in the coastal zone notwithstanding any temporary discontin-
uance of operations after said date provided that said discontinu-
ance does not exceed one year."28 3 In 1988, the one year period
was extended to two years. 28 4 Clearly, the General Assembly was
concerned that a temporary discontinuance of operations could al-
ter Phoenix Steel's status as a nonconforming use, and so wanted
to legislate that possibility out of existence by giving Phoenix
Steel a "grace period." Thus, a fair reading of the 1984 amendment
is that abandonment is possible whenever operation discontinue
at a site.28 5 Further, given the narrow scope of the 1984 amend-
ment, no other abandoned use would get the benefit of the two-
year grace period.
While the Act does not directly address the issue, the 1999
Regulations clearly do. Facilities that are "abandoned" cannot be
reinstated "except as otherwise provided under the Act"2 6-
which, given the lack of any provisions in the Act, means once
abandoned, a use's status is lost. Abandonment requires an inves-
tigation by the Secretary28 7 to determine if the cessation of activ-
tions affected by the permitted facility. The Board finds this evidence sufficient to
establish that he is a 'person aggrieved' with standing to appeal the Secretary's deci-
sion," though not citing Oceanport).
283. 64 Del. Laws 571-572 (1984). The Act making this amendment states that its
purpose is to "prevent the severe impact on the economy of the State of Delaware
which would result form the financial collapse of Phoenix Steel Corporation" and in-
cluded loans and other assistance. Id. at 571.
284. See 66 Del. Laws 491 (1988).
285. Other interpretations support this conclusion. See 1984 REPORT, supra note 5,
at 4-2 (summarizing April 30, 1979 Attorney General Opinion as saying that a discon-
tinued nonconforming manufacturing use can get a new permit, but a renewed use
would be prohibited if it is a heavy industry use).
286. 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. § 12.1 (Weil 2004).
287. Id. § 12.4.
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ity is temporary or an abandonment. 28  The Secretary may
consider factors such as the status of permits and licenses, main-
tenance of machinery and structures, duration of the cessation,
and owner presence and attempts to reinstate the use.28 9 The
Secretary must determine that the owner intends to abandon; in-
voluntary shutdown without such an intent "shall not be deemed
an abandonment." 290 If the Secretary believes abandonment has
occurred, he must give notice to the owner, who has sixty days to
demonstrate no intent to abandon. 291 The Secretary must an-
nounce a final decision and give public notice. 292
III. LESSONS TO LEARN FROM THE ACT
After nearly thirty-seven years, experience under the Act sug-
gests that certain lessons can be learned from the interpretation
and application of the Act. Some of these lessons are local in na-
ture, suggesting how Delaware should move forward in utilizing
the Act. Others offer suggestions to coastal states that may now
be looking for ways to protect remaining coastal resources before
they are lost forever. Each set of lessons are important legacies of
the Act that deserve serious consideration.
A. Lessons For Delaware
From the local perspective of the State of Delaware, perhaps
the biggest question after nearly thirty-seven years is whether the
Act has been successful. On a macro level, the evidence suggests
that Delaware's Coastal Zone Act has proved to be an effective
control on industrial development in Delaware's coastal zone. The
oil refinery, bulk shipping artificial island, and supertanker port
that drove its original enactment have not been built. The pur-
pose of the Act to prohibit new heavy industry uses293 has largely
been fulfilled in that numerous attempts to build heavy indus-
try-either through amending the Act or through proposals
presented under the Act-have been thwarted. The declared pub-
lic policy to "encourage introduction of new industry" through a
288. Id. § 12.3.
289. Id.: These factors were first identified in a August 6, 1981 Opinion of the At-
torney General. See 1984 REPORT, supra note 5, at 4-3.
290. Id. § 12.4.
291. Id.
292. §§ 12.5-12.6.
293. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7001 (2007).
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controlled permitting process 294 appears to have been met in that,
while new heavy industry has not sprung up, lower impact manu-
facturing uses have been allowed. Tourism and recreation-the
primary use of coastal resources that the Act seeks to "safe-
guard"295-provide significant economic benefits to the state.296
Thus, at this macro, results-oriented perspective, one can con-
clude that the Act has been a success.
At a micro, function-oriented perspective (that is, how the
Courts, Board, and permitting authority have performed), the re-
sults are more mixed:
Delaware Courts. The courts have done an excellent job in
protecting and strengthening the Act in their interpretations of
its provisions. Coastal Barge and City of Wilmington are exam-
ples where the court articulated and applied the four principles
of interpretation to find ways for the Act to apply because such
interpretation was most consistent with the purpose of the Act.
Coastal Barge is the most obvious example of this; even though
the Act literally applied only to transfers between vessel and
shore, the Court found that vessel to vessel transfers must also
fall within the Act's regulatory purview because the pollution
risks the Act seeks to prevent are the same, and excluding ves-
sel-to-vessel transfers would be unreasonable and absurd in
light of the Act's purpose to prevent such pollution. Thus far,
the Delaware Supreme Court has been creative and staunch in
its support of the Act. The Delaware lower courts' record is
largely positive, having been affirmed in Coastal Barge and
Kearney, reversed in City of Wilmington, and no review of
Kreshtool, Shields and Vane Line. By and large, the Delaware
courts have been an effective bulwark against challenges to the
Act's reach and regulation.
The Board. Given the nature and extent of the Board's ju-
risdiction, it is perhaps not surprising that the Board's perform-
ance in furthering the purpose and objectives of the Act is more
mixed. The Board's interpretive decisions were upheld in
Kreshtool, Coastal Barge, and Kearney, but reversed in Shields
and Vane Line. Arguably, the Board's early definition of "expan-
sion or extension" put a significant amount of industrial activity
outside the reach of the Act, and that seems inconsistent with
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See, e.g., Adam Sacks, Managing Dir., Travel & Tourism, Global Insight, How
Important is Tourism to Delaware? (June 9, 2005), http://dedo.delaware.gov/informa-
tion/tourism/DETSA2005.ppt (power point presentation reporting $1.2 billion total ec-
onomic impact to state).
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the Act's purpose to "control the location, extent and type of in-
dustrial development in Delaware's coastal areas"29 7 (though
the effect was largely neutralized by the 1992 amendment re-
quiring all expansions or extensions of nonconforming uses be
permitted). The Board's latest ruling in Vane Line, as discussed
infra, raises some concern that the Board is not interpreting the
Act correctly, at least with respect to nonconforming uses.
The Permitting Authority. The State Planner originally,
and now the Secretary of DNREC, have the greatest amount
and widest range of responsibility under the Act. After 266 sta-
tus decisions and numerous other permitting decision, the re-
cord for those decisions is mixed but mostly positive. Of the
known status decisions, eight were affirmed by the Board, while
three were overturned (a 62.5% affirmance rate), with 254 deci-
sions (95.8% of all status decisions) ultimately reviewed by the
Board, while all six of the appealed permitting decisions were
affirmed by the Board. Of the permitting authority decisions re-
viewed by courts, three (in Kreshtool, Coastal Barge, and Kear-
ney) were upheld by the court. In terms of administering the
Act, the Permitting Authority actively applied the Board's "ex-
pansion or extension" definition that put significant industrial
activity outside the scope of the Act in at least seventy-five in-
stances. The Secretary of DNREC has actively applied the 1999
Regulation's offset proposal requirements, and appears to be de-
manding and obtaining promises that will create net reductions
in pollution.
While these signs appear to be generally positive, there are
emerging threats to the Act's continued effectiveness that arise
primarily out of how the Act is now being interpreted. The "ca-
nary in the coal mine" for these problems is in the application of
the four general principles of statutory construction under the
Act. Since the City of Wilmington decision in 1991, the only two
court cases to analyze the Act did not cite to any of the four princi-
ples or to the two cases that articulated them.298 Of the fourteen
Board decisions since Coastal Barge, only five mention Coastal
297. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7001.
298. See DNREC v. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc., No. 06A-12-001-ESB (Del. Super.
Ct. Nov. 16, 2007); Kearney v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., 2005 WL 3844219
(Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2005), affd, 897 A.2d. 767 (Del. 2006). The Vane Line deci-
sion does discuss Coastal Barge, but only in the context of applying its holding that
vessel-to-vessel transfers constitute bulk product transfer facilities. It did not discuss
Coastal Barge in the context of providing any principles or guidance for statutory
interpretation.
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Barge or City of Wilmington,299 and of those five, only two actually
discuss or apply one or more of the four principles to the matter at
hand.300 It is as if the principles have been relegated to historical
footnotes or forgotten in a bout of amnesia. The risk is that, with-
out proper attention to the four principles, interpretations of the
Act may lose their mooring to the Act's intent and core values
without the parties even knowing that it has happened.
Why is this important? The general principles of statutory
construction that the Delaware Supreme Court has articulated for
interpreting the Act-that the purpose of the Act is important,
that one must harmonize the entire Act, that the Act must be lib-
erally construed to maximize its applicability, and that one must
favor reasonable interpretations over unreasonable ones-are
critical to effective application of the Act. Coastal Barge and City
of Wilmington-the cases that collectively articulated these four
principles-could not have been decided without them. The wis-
dom inherent in these principles is two-fold. First, the four princi-
ples provide a means to ensure that a proffered interpretation is
ultimately moored to the core of the Act. Interpretations that
comply with the four principles tend to be ones that further the
purposes of the Act. Coastal Barge, for example, dramatically
shows that an interpretation which includes vessel-to-vessel
transfers of bulk product within the definition of bulk product
transfer facilities better fits with the purpose, terms, and reasona-
ble scope of the Act. At a fundamental level, it "makes sense"
given the Act's language and intent. Likewise, the four principles
can help to expose what the City of Wilmington court called
"pinched" constructions of the Act-interpretations that must be
rejected because of some fundamental flaw. Thus, the four princi-
ples serve as guideposts that assure interpretations do not drift
from the Act's core values.
299. See In re Fischer Enterprises, Inc., No. 192, at 6 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus.
Control Bd. Oct. 28, 1986) (appeal of status decision) (copy on file with author); In re
Occidental Chem. Co., No. 259, at 13 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. July 29,
1992) (copy on file with author); In re Texaco's Proposed Re-Refining, No. 260SD, at
13-14, 16 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. July 9, 1992) (appeal of the Secre-
tary's decision finding Texaco's re-refining to be a "New Prohibited Heavy Industry")
(copy on file with author); In re Delaware Audubon Soc'y, No. 95-1, at 10 (Del. Coastal
Zone Indus. Control Bd. July 28, 1995) (copy on file with author); Vane Line, No. CZ
2006-01, at 4, 22 (Del. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd. Dec. 1, 2006).
300. See In re Texaco's Proposed Re-Refining, No. 260SD, at 14, 16 (citing Coastal
Barge, applying harmony rule and rejecting interpretation as an absurd result); Vane
Line, No. 06A-12-001-ESB, slip op. at 22 (citing Coastal Barge, referencing the golden
rule of statutory interpretation to avoid unreasonable results).
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The second aspect of the wisdom inherent in the four princi-
ples flows from the first. For if the four principles serve as guide-
posts that help keep interpretations moored to the Act's purpose
and core values, then they can also provide a convenient yardstick
against which to measure a potential interpretation of the Act. In
other words, the four principles provide a methodology by which
an advocate, the Board, or a court can interpret the Act. Con-
sciously analyzing whether a proposed interpretation is consistent
with and fulfills the purpose and intent of the Act, harmonizes
with all other provisions in the Act, maximizes the applicability of
the Act, and produces reasonable consequences will likely produce
a final interpretation that is consistent with and true to the Act's
core values.
When the four principles are forgotten, the ability of an advo-
cate or decisionmaker to assure that its interpretation is ulti-
mately moored in the Act can be crippled without the
decisionmaker even knowing it. Vane Line is a good example of
this problem because the method by which the Board reached its
decision is troubling in light of the four principles. As noted
above, the Board in Vane Line viewed "use" as ambiguous in the
sense that it is unclear whether it refers to the activity being per-
formed (which the Board referred to as the "use") or the person
performing the activity (which the Board referred to as the
"user").301 The Board found that the activity of oil lightering qual-
ified as a nonconforming use, and even though Vane Line's pro-
posed operation was not in existence on June 28, 1971, because a
different operator's oil lightering operation was engaged in the ac-
tivity Vane Line's proposed new operation would be merely an ex-
pansion of that nonconforming use.30 2 In reaching its decision,
the Board only referenced the fourth principles (favoring reasona-
ble interpretations over unreasonable ones), 30 3 and did not discuss
the application of that principle in any detail. How, then, does the
analysis compare against the four principles?
Purpose of the Act. Coastal Barge teaches that transfers of
bulk quantities of product between vessels (which is the essence of
oil lightering) falls within the Act's definition of bulk product
transfer facilities, and that the concern over the potential pollu-
tion effect of such vessel-to-vessel transfers set forth in § 7001 is
behind the prohibition against bulk product transfer facilities in
301. Vane Line, No. CZ 2006-01, at 22, 24.
302. Id. at 23.
303. Id. at 22.
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§ 7003. The Board's failure to consider the Act's purpose behind
the § 7003 prohibition, and whether its ruling furthers the pur-
pose of the Act reflected in § 7001, means that the Board missed
an opportunity to assure its conclusion was in fact consistent with
the purpose of the Act.
Harmonize the Entire Act. The issue as framed by the Board
was the meaning of the term "use" in the definition of "noncon-
forming use."30 4 While "use" is not defined in the Act, it does ap-
pear in numerous places in the Act. 305 The principle of
harmonizing the entire Act requires that the interpretation ap-
plied in one part of the Act must work in all parts of the Act, given
the generally accepted rule for construction of any statute that the
same words should not be given two different meanings in the
same statute.30 6 The Board's only textual analysis of the Act was
to note that the definition refers to "use" as opposed to "user";30 7
the Board failed to look at how the term "use" is used in other
parts of the Act. Arguably, the term "use" has a location- or facil-
ity-specific meaning elsewhere in the Act,30 8 which seems to cut
304. Id.
305. See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7002(b) (2007) ("'Nonconforming use' means a
use, whether of land or a structure, which does not comply with the applicable use
provisions of this chapter where such use was lawfully in existence and in active
use.... .") (emphasis added); id. § 7002(c) (environmental impact statement defined as
detailed description of "effect of the proposed use on the immediate and surrounding
environment and natural resources") (emphasis added); id. § 7002(e) (heavy industry
use "means a use" characteristically involving specified size and equipment) (empha-
sis added); id. § 7003 (prohibiting "heavy industry uses") (emphasis added); id.
§ 7004(a) (allowing "manufacturing uses" and expansion of "nonconforming uses" by
permit and requiring that "county or municipality having jurisdiction has first ap-
proved the use in question by zoning procedures provided by law") (emphasis added).
306. See e.g., State v. Reynolds, 836 A.2d 224, 286 (Conn. 2003), cert denied, 541
U.S. 908 (2004) (identical term used in statutory provisions pertaining to same sub-
ject matter should not be read to have different meanings unless there is some indica-
tion from the legislature that it intended such a result) (citing Nancy G. v. Dep't of
Children & Families, 733 A.2d 136, 145 (Conn. 1999). See also Commonwealth v.
Saul, 499 A.2d 358, 360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
307. Vane Line, No. CZ 2006-01, at 24. The Superior Court found that the distinc-
tion between use and user "while true, is meaningless." DNREC v. Vane Line Bunker-
ing, Inc., No. 06A-12-001-ESB, slip op. at 11 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2007).
308. See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7002(b) (definition of a nonconforming use;
speaking of a "use of land or a structure"); § 7002(e) (definition of a heavy industry
use; speaking of characteristics based on facility size, specific equipment used at facil-
ity, and specific effects of facility-specific potential to pollute); and § 7004(a), (b) (al-
lowing manufacturing use to obtain a permit and articulating factors to consider in
granting permit, including facility-specific environmental, aesthetic, economic, neigh-
boring property, and land use planning impacts). In finding that "nonconforming
use" only refers to a facility, the Vane Line court relied upon the language of
§ 7002(b). Vane Line, No. 06A-12-001-ESB, slip op. at 6-7.
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against the idea that a nonconforming use can be an activity (that
can be conducted in many locations and at many facilities). Ap-
plying that meaning to "use" as it appears in the definition of
"nonconforming use" would suggest that nonconforming uses are
specific facilities instead of activities that could be done at many
facilities-exactly what the Superior Court found.30 9 From a per-
spective of the principles of statutory construction, if the term
"use" has a facility- or location-specific meaning elsewhere in the
Act, then applying a meaning of use that is not facility- or loca-
tion-specific in construing § 7002(b) does not appear to harmonize
the section with the rest of the Act. The 1999 Regulations also
support a distinction between "use" and "activity," specifically
identifying four different variations on bulk transfers as "uses or
activities [that] are prohibited in the Coastal Zone." 310 This lan-
guage reveals that "uses" and "activities" must be different things
(because it uses both terms, and if they meant the same thing
then one of the terms is superfluous, which would violate the gen-
eral rule of statutory construction to avoid interpretations which
render terms meaningless or mere surplusagea31).Thus, the
Board's equation of "use" for purposes of nonconforming uses with
an "activity" like oil lightering appears to be inconsistent and not
in harmony with the use of the term "use" elsewhere in the Act.
Having failed to conduct a harmonization analysis, the Board
missed an opportunity to assure its conclusion was in fact consis-
tent with the terms of the Act.
Liberal Construction of the Act. City of Wilmington teaches
that liberal construction of the Act means interpreting it to maxi-
mize the Act's coverage and minimizing the Act's exceptions and
limitations. In Vane Line, the prohibition at issue is § 7003's bar
on bulk product transfer facilities, while the exception of limita-
tion at issue is the limited regulation of nonconforming uses.
Thus, a "liberal" construction of the Act would want to make sure
that the prohibition on new bulk product transfer facilities is ex-
309. Vane Line, No. 06A-12-001-ESB, slip op. at 6-7.
310. 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. § 4.3 (Weil 2007) ("offshore gas, liquid, or solid
bulk product transfer facilities which were not in operation on June 28, 1971"); § 4.5
("bulk product transfer facilities and pipelines which serve as bulk transfer facilities
that were not in operation on June 28, 1971"); § 4.6 ("the conversion or use of existing
unregulated, exempt, or permitted docking facilities for the transfer of bulk prod-
ucts"); and § 4.7 ("the construction, establishment, or operation of offshore gas, liquid,
or solid bulk product transfer facilities which were not in operation on June 28,
1971").
311. See Grimes v. Alteon, 804 A.2d 256, 264 (Del. 2002).
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tended as far as possible while the inclusion of things within the
nonconforming use category is restricted as much as possible in
order to, as City of Wilmington says, "fully achieve the legislative
goal of environmental protection."312 Arguably, the Board's con-
clusion making any activity taking place in June 1971 a "noncon-
forming use" that allows brand new facilities to be built because
they are merely "expansions" appears to restrict the prohibition
against bulk product transfer facilities and expand the noncon-
forming use exception-the opposite of what is required by the lib-
eral construction rule of City of Wilmington. Having failed to
conduct a liberal construction analysis, the Board missed an op-
portunity to assure its interpretation was in fact a "liberal" appli-
cation of the Act's terms.
Favoring Reasonable Interpretations Over Unreasonable
Ones. This final principle from Coastal Barge requires examining
the logical consequences of an interpretation. Allowing an activity
taking place in June 1971 to be a "nonconforming use" that allows
brand new facilities to be built because they are merely "expan-
sions" leads to the unreasonable and absurd result of expressly
prohibited facilities (such as oil refineries) being allowed because
they were merely "expansions" of the activity of oil refining. The
Board's response to this argument-that new oil refineries could
not be built because they fall within the express definition of
§ 7002(e) and are therefore prohibited heavy industry under
§ 7003 313-ignores the fact that being a nonconforming use
trumps the prohibition of § 7003, 3 14 and thus a new refinery
merely "expanding" the nonconforming use of the activity of oil re-
fining should not (under the Board's logic) be barred.31 5 In effect,
312. City of Wilmington v. Parcel of Land, 607 A.2d 1163, 1166 (Del. 1992).
313. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc. v. DNREC, No. CZ 2006-01, at 27 (Del. Coastal
Zone Indus. Control Bd. Dec. 1, 2006).
314. Nonconforming uses are "not prohibited" by the Act. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7,
§ 7004(a). As noted supra Section II.D, the very definition of nonconforming use re-
quires that the "use" in question be something otherwise prohibited under the Act
(i.e., a heavy industry use, bulk product transfer facility, or manufacturing use with-
out a permit) that was in use in 1971. So, for example, the Delaware City refinery is
allowed to continue operating as a nonconforming use because, even though it clearly
fits the definition of heavy industry, it was in active use on June 28, 1971. Thus,
under the terms of the Act, being a nonconforming use trumps § 7003's prohibition
against heavy industry uses.
315. Though not citing it in the context of applying the fourth principle of statutory
construction, the Superior Court's response to the Board's argument was quite blunt:
If the Board can understand that new refineries and chemical plants,
which are 'heavy industry uses,' are prohibited by § 7003 because they
were not in operation on June 28, 1971, then I am at a total loss as to why
[Vol. 25
62http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol25/iss1/2
KEEPING THE COAST CLEAR
the Board's reasoning requires that one assume that the General
Assembly passed the Act to prevent the Shell refinery from being
built, and included language specifically identifying refineries as
prohibited "heavy industry uses" under the Act,3 16 while knowing
that the new refineries could be built because the activity of oil
refining (in lawful existence and active use on June 28, 1971 by
virtue of the Delaware City refinery) was a nonconforming use not
prohibited under the Act. That incongruity should be strong evi-
dence of the unreasonableness of viewing an activity as a noncon-
forming use.
In short, the Board adopted an interpretation under the Act
that appears to violate all four principles of statutory construction
under the Act. As the Superior Court described in reversing the
decision, "the Board tried to understand the meaning of 'noncon-
forming use' in a vacuum, resulting in the logistical quagmire that
is the Board's decision."317 The use and application of the princi-
ples might have avoided such a result. As long as the principles
are not recognized and given due importance in the process of in-
terpreting the Act, the ability to moor the interpretation in the
core principles and terms of the Act will continue to be at risk
because the natural checks and constraints on erroneous interpre-
tations provided by the wisdom of the four principles will be
absent.
What, then, can be done to revitalize the role of the four prin-
ciples in efforts to interpret the Act? The first step is to recognize
the four principles and their importance to the Act itself. The sec-
ond step is to consciously require a thorough consideration of the
four principles in each effort of statutory construction. This is not
some kind of "checklist" approach, in which the four principles be-
come platitudes to which an advocate, the Secretary, the Board, or
a court can pay mere lip service without really applying their
deeper meaning. Instead, advocates should hold each other's posi-
the Board cannot understand why Vane's new vessel-to-vessel oil lighter-
ing facility is also prohibited by § 7003 because it was not in operation on
June 28, 1971.
DNREC v. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc., No. 06A-12-001-ESB, slip op. at 15 (Del. Super.
Ct. Nov. 16, 2007)
316. See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7, § 7002(e) (defining "heavy industry use" that is
later prohibited in § 7003 and including the language "[e]xamples of heavy industry
are oil refineries.").
317. Vane Line, No. 06A-12-001-ESB, slip op. at 8. In an amended decision issued
days later, the Superior Court changed the word "logistical" to "logical." See Vane
Line Bunkering, Inc. v. DNREC, No. 06A-12-001-ESB, slip op. at 8 (amended opinion
issued November 19, 2007) (copy on file with author).
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tions up to the light of the principles: does the opposing side's in-
terpretation promote or diminish the purpose of the Act? Does
that interpretation harmonize with other provisions in the Act?
Does the interpretation maximize the Act's applicability and mini-
mize the exceptions to the Act in an appropriate manner? Are the
results of the interpretation reasonable or are they absurd? The
Board and the courts should demand that the advocates before
them explore these issues, and then apply the same four princi-
ples to their own analyses and interpretations under the Act. By
adopting this "common language" based on the four principles, the
entire process of interpreting the Act will continue to invoke the
wisdom that underlies the four principles and better assure that
interpretations stay closely tied to the Act's purpose, intent, and
text. Honest consideration of the four principles still leaves plenty
of room for responsible yet vigorous advocacy-especially when it
comes to cases of first impression-but the results of such advo-
cacy will always have at their core the advancement of the Act
itself. Awareness of, sensitivity for, and fealty to the four princi-
ples is the best defense for keeping the Act vital and protective of
Delaware's natural resources in the coastal areas. Thus, an im-
portant lesson for Delaware to learn from the Act's history is the
need to remember and apply in a meaningful way the four princi-
ples of statutory construction of the Act.
B. Lessons For Other Coastal States
While Delaware's lessons focus on the details of the Act's ap-
plication, the lessons available for other coastal states look at
larger issues arising from the Act's structure and application.
Because the federal Coastal Zone Management Act squarely
puts the onus for coastal preservation on the states,318 each
coastal state theoretically has the ability to adopt policies and
laws similar in scope to the Coastal Zone Act. No such coastal
state has done so. Indeed, given the emphasis in other states on
balancing economic development with coastal preservation, 319 and
the differences between the relatively undeveloped coast of Dela-
ware in 1971 and the varied levels of development in other states'
coastal zones, the likelihood of other coastal states following Dela-
ware's lead in absolutely banning new heavy industry and bulk
product transfer facilities appears remote.
318. See supra note 11.
319. See supra note 10.
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While other states may not be interested in the broad prohibi-
tions of the Act, there are at least two narrower aspects of the Act
that can be instructive: § 7004(b)'s six factor analysis for coastal
zone permits and the concept of environmental offsets.
Lessons From § 7004(b)'s Six Factor Analysis
The six factors of § 7004(b) can be a useful guide for coastal
states because they provide a comprehensive review of what a pro-
posed project will do to the coastal environment. The six factors-
environmental impact, economic impact, aesthetic impact, impact
on neighboring land uses, impacts on local land use plans, and
size impacts 32 0-require the permitting authority to go beyond a
perhaps narrower view that focuses only on environmental and
economic impacts. They do so in two ways. First, the environmen-
tal impact factor is broader than one might otherwise expect. It
requires consideration of probable pollution under both normal op-
erating conditions as well as during mechanical malfunction and
human error.321 Thus, consideration of "worst case scenarios" is
built into the analysis. In addition, the environmental impact fac-
tor goes beyond obvious environmental impacts (like air and water
pollution) to explicitly require analysis of things like impacts on
drainage, flood control, land erosion, and effects on surface,
ground, and subsurface water resources from operations, 322 as
well as the "likelihood of generation of glare, heat, noise, vibra-
tion, radiation, electromagnetic interference and obnoxious
odors."323 In short, the environmental impact factor encompasses
a wide range of impacts, the consideration of which will likely pro-
vide greater protection for the coastal environment simply by
making more projects have negative environmental impacts. Sec-
ond, consideration of aesthetic and land use impacts broadens the
focus of the permitting process to a larger picture of how a project
impacts the coastal zone as a whole. This broader focus on non-
environmental impacts beyond the project site itself likely pro-
vides greater protection for the coastal environment simply by
320. DEL CODE. ANN. TIT. 7, § 7004(b). See supra Section II.C for a full discussion
of the six factors.
321. Id. § 7004(b)(1).
322. Id.
323. Id. See also In re Jacob Kreshtool, No. 221P, at 8, 10 (Del. Coastal Zone In-
dus. Control Bd. July 22, 1988) (appeal from the Delmarva Power & Light Co. Gas
Combustion Turbine Permit Decision) (finding noise from new gas turbines at power
plant are a negative environmental impact, but requiring modification of permit con-
dition to set a specific decibel level reading) (copy on file with author).
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making projects be more compatible with the area in which they
will operate.
Section 7004(b)'s broader focus on the project's impacts pro-
vides other coastal states with a model for approaching develop-
ment within their respective coastal zones. Adoption of the six
factors would still allow those states to engage in their own bal-
ance of environmental and economic interests, but would assure
that such balancing is more informed by injecting the full impacts
of the project into the balancing analysis. More informed decision-
making about how valuable coastal resources will be used is the
best defense against uncontrolled development and exploitation of
those resources. Coastal states would do well to learn from Dela-
ware's example and seek to apply the § 7004(b) six factor analysis
to their decisions on whether to allow coastal development
projects to go forward.
Lessons From Environmental Offsets
An underappreciated aspect of the Act as applied in Delaware
is the 1999 Regulation's requirement that a permittee engaging in
any "activity or facility that will result in any negative environ-
mental impact"324 must reduce those negative environmental im-
pacts through an "offset proposal"325 that "must more than offset
the negative environmental impacts associated with the proposed
project or activity."326 Properly submitted offsets have the effect
of reducing net negative environmental effects in the Coastal
Zone. In effect, the permittee makes a trade: to get the privilege
to create some negative environmental impacts, the permittee
must reduce other impacts such that there is a net improvement
in the coastal environment. Properly applied, offsets can have a
measurably positive impact on coastal resources.
Delaware's environmental offset regulations provide a model
for coastal states to protect the coastal resources they generally
recognize as "valuable."327 Imposing a requirement of an environ-
mental offset on activities in coastal areas can garner coastal
states the best of both worlds: allowing development that the state
believes satisfies the balance of economic and environmental in-
terests while at the same time providing positive environmental
benefits to the state's coastal resources. Coastal states would do
324. 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. § 9.1 (Weil 2007).
325. Id. § 9.0.
326. Id. §§ 9.1.1, .2.
327. See supra note 10.
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well to learn from Delaware's example and seek to apply environ-
mental offset requirements to coastal development projects.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the Act begins to draw close to the end of its fourth decade
of operation, there are many signs that it has achieved much of
what its authors intended. The oil refineries and large industrial
port complex so feared in the lead up to the passage of the Act 328
never materialized, but non-heavy industry uses have been built
under CZA permits. Recreation and tourism-the interests cited
in § 7001 as the primary uses that the Act seeks to safeguard-
have continued to thrive and provide positive economic and aes-
thetic benefits to the State of Delaware. In short, the Act has been
a success, and provides a model for other coastal states to follow in
keeping their own coasts clear of the development that threatens
valuable coastal resources.
In Delaware, the Act's future success, however, depends upon
a continued commitment by the citizenry, the regulated commu-
nity, the Board, and the judiciary to remain true to the purposes
that animated the Act at its passage. Going forward, the Act's
greatest enemies may be amnesia about the origins and original
purposes of the Act and complacency about thoughtful application
of the principles that have guided interpretation of the Act. Effec-
tive advocacy and thoughtful consideration of issues raised in fu-
ture cases will be the best chance for the Act to continue in its role
as one of "the most original and innovative environmental and
land use statutes in the world."329
328. See supra note 2.
329. 7-100-101 DEL. CODE REGS. pmbl.
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